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dc.contributor.authorEggertsson, Gauti B.
dc.contributor.authorProulx, Kevin B.
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-01T00:07:33Z
dc.date.available2019-11-01T00:07:33Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.isbn978-956-7421-52-7
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3849
dc.descriptionThis paper looks back on the professional consensus about monetary policy at the zero bound prior to the 2008 crisis and proposes a calibrated model that provides one interpretation to explain why it was somewhat off base. The general consensus in the economics profession in the late 1990s when Japan was experiencing difficulties due to deflation and the zero bound was that increasing the money supply in one of a variety of ways was a simple and straightforward answer to stimulating aggregate demand.
dc.format.pdf
dc.format.extentSección o Parte de un Documento
dc.format.mediump. 63-104
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherBanco Central de Chile
dc.relation.ispartofSeries on Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies no. 24
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/*
dc.subjectLIQUIDEZ (ECONOMÍA)es_ES
dc.subjectPOLÍTICA MONETARIAes_ES
dc.subjectCRISIS ECONÓMICA 2008es_ES
dc.titleBernanke's no-arbitrage argument revisited: can open market operations in real assets eliminate the liquidity trap?
dc.type.docArtículo
dc.file.nameBCCh-sbc-v24-p063_104


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile