Designing labor market institutions

dc.contributor.author	Blanchard, Olivier
dc.date.accessioned	2019-11-01T00:02:53Z
dc.date.available	2019-11-01T00:02:53Z
dc.date.issued	2005
dc.identifier.isbn	956-7421-20-X
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3689
dc.description	There is fairly wide agreement among economists on what constitutes optimal—or at least good—product market and financial market institutions. There is much less agreement on what constitutes optimal—or at least good—labor market institutions. As a result, the public debate is too often dominated by clichés and slogans. “Get rid of labor market rigidities” is one of the most frequent. Meanwhile, policymakers focus on politically feasible, incremental reforms, with little sense of the ultimate goal. Economists could play a more useful role here. This is why Jean Tirole and I decided to explore the optimal design of labor market institutions. This paper represents a progress report. It gives a sense of the general architecture we see coming out of our analysis.
dc.format	.pdf
dc.format.extent	Sección o Parte de un Documento
dc.format.medium	p. 367-381
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Banco Central de Chile
dc.relation.ispartof	Series on Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies, no. 8
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/	*
dc.subject	MERCADO LABORAL	es_ES
dc.title	Designing labor market institutions
dc.type.doc	Artículo
dc.file.name	BCCh-sbc-v08-p367_381

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