Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives

dc.contributor.author	Bennett C., Herman
dc.contributor.author	Loayza O., Norman
dc.date.accessioned	2019-11-01T00:01:36Z
dc.date.available	2019-11-01T00:01:36Z
dc.date.issued	2002
dc.identifier.isbn	956-7421-099
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3659
dc.description	Until recently, the debate on the relationship between monetary and fiscal authorities centered on the inflationary consequences of mentary financing of the fiscal deficit. The moderately high inflation of the 1970s in some industrialized countries and, particularly, the recurring episodes of very high inflation in several developing countries seeking to avoid high and variable inflation has been to institute an independent monetary authority whose main mandate is the control of inflation.
dc.format	.pdf
dc.format.extent	Sección o Parte de un Documento
dc.format.medium	p. 299-330
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Banco Central de Chile
dc.relation.ispartof	Serieson Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies, no. 4
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/	*
dc.subject	POLÍTICA MONETARIA	es_ES
dc.subject	POLÍTICA FISCAL	es_ES
dc.subject	INFLACIÓN	es_ES
dc.title	Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives
dc.type.doc	Artículo
dc.file.name	BCCh-sbc-v04-p299_330

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