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dc.contributor.authorMedina, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.authorValdés, Rodrigo
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-01T00:01:29Z
dc.date.available2019-11-01T00:01:29Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.isbn956-7421-099
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3652
dc.descriptionPolicymarkers and the academic community have reached an increasing consensus during the last two decades: the primary objective of monetary policy should be to control inflation (see, for example, King, 1999). A less settled issue is the appropriate role of the central bank regarding other, secondary obkectives.
dc.format.pdf
dc.format.extentSección o Parte de un Documento
dc.format.mediump. 65-94
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherBanco Central de Chile
dc.relation.ispartofSerieson Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies, no. 4
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/*
dc.subjectPOLÍTICA MONETARIAes_ES
dc.subjectINFLACIÓNes_ES
dc.subjectBANCOS CENTRALESes_ES
dc.titleOptimal monetary policy rules when the current account matters
dc.type.docArtículo
dc.file.nameBCCh-sbc-v04-p065_094


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile