

# CENTRAL BANKING WITH MANY VOICES: THE COMMUNICATIONS ARMS RACE

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## Independence, Credibility, and Communication of Central Banking

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# IMPROVING U.S. MONETARY POLICY COMMUNICATIONS

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The job of central bankers is to use the monetary powers granted to them to promote price stability, sustainable growth, and a stable financial system. They do this in an environment fraught with unavoidable uncertainties. But, in conducting policy, there is one uncertainty that policymakers can and should reduce: the uncertainty they themselves create. Everyone agrees that monetary policymakers should do their best to minimize the noise that their actions add to the environment. When policy is transparent and effective, people in the economy and financial markets respond to the data, not to the policymakers.

During the past quarter-century, the evolution of an ever more detailed inflation-targeting framework facilitated a vast improvement

It is traditional to use the introductory footnote to thank colleagues who contributed comments and advice. In this case, there were dozens of people without whom we could not have written this paper. First, 24 former senior officials, academics and market economists responded orally or in writing to our open-ended survey; many have agreed to allow us to quote them in the text. Second, numerous people offered their guidance and answered our numerous questions. These include a number of current FOMC members, Lewis Alexander, Seamus Brown, Donald Kohn, Ellen Meade, Hiroshi Nakaso, Debarshi Nandy, Masaaki Shirakawa, and Paul Tucker. Third, our discussants, Jón Steinsson at the Federal Reserve's Conference on Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communication Practices (A Fed Listens Event) on June 4–5, 2019, and Petra Geraats at the XIII Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile on July 22–23, 2019, provided very useful comments, as did Conference attendees. Fourth, we thank Scott Davis and Mark Wynne for sharing their data. And fifth, but certainly not last, Jonathan Robidoux carefully and diligently transcribed the oral interviews

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in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) communication.<sup>1</sup> Over the same period, both the level and uncertainty of inflation have declined.<sup>2</sup> We infer that since the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy has been reaping the benefits of a credible commitment to price stability, including a communications framework that reinforces that commitment.

It is in this context that we take on the task of evaluating the Federal Reserve's monetary policy communications and suggest further improvements. A set of two dozen interviews, as well as our reading of published work, leads us to organize our recommendations around three objectives:

- simplifying public statements, while conveying any divergence of views;
- clarifying how policy will react to changing conditions;
- and highlighting policy uncertainty and risks.

Our purpose in this paper is to explore how policymakers can revise and enhance their agreed-upon communications practices to meet these objectives. In doing so, we take the annual Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy<sup>3</sup> as the foundation on which all other FOMC communication should be built. We also distinguish between ideal approaches and ones that, given governance challenges, may be more practical.

**Simplifying public statements:** Reaching the broadest possible audience requires communicating in plain English. Because the post-meeting statement conveys the key decisions, it is among the FOMC's most important communications tools and should be accessible to a broad audience. We discuss how to simplify the statement to make it more readable while adding relevant information.<sup>4</sup>

1. Appendix D provides a brief history of key changes in FOMC communications since 1993. Blinder and others (2008) review the theory and evidence regarding communication. In their study of 112 central banks from 1998 to 2015, Dinger and others (2019) document the *global* trend toward greater monetary policy transparency.

2. For example, the dispersion (as measured by the interquartile range of responses) in the Survey of Professional Forecasters forecasts of 10-year consumer-price inflation has fallen by roughly 25 basis points per decade since 1991. See our discussion in Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2019).

3. See <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190130b.htm>.

4. See Haldane and McMahon (2018) on the need for innovation and experimentation in communication with the public. A "layered" communications strategy aims to convey policy-relevant information at multiple levels of complexity, consistent with having diverse audiences with varying degrees of interest and expertise.

Communication by multiple FOMC participants can foster confusion.<sup>5</sup> There is a sense in which this “cacophony” problem has been getting worse. Kliesen and others (2019) report that the frequency at which Reserve Bank Presidents speak has risen by about a third over the past decade, so that today there are roughly 60 days per year when more than one speaks. Some of this reflects the necessary clarification of differences in views—for example, when officials articulate the rationale for dissents—but we propose changes that could reduce noise and uncertainty created by the multiplicity of speakers.

Despite its great benefits, no one should take central-bank independence for granted. Consequently, it is in the collective interest of FOMC participants to encourage what Alan Blinder refers to as “group accountability.”<sup>6</sup> This means establishing practices and norms that make communications more effective. For example, one useful practice is to encourage each participant to explain the Committee’s decision, supporting it when they agree or explaining their dissent when they do not. To foster a stronger group mindset, we believe that participants could shift to using the first person plural (“we,” “our,” and “us”) when explaining consensus decisions, and the first person singular (“I,” “my,” and “me”) when describing dissents.

We conclude from our interviews that it would be useful to focus public comments more on the rationale for recent decisions, on the prospect for key policy drivers—such as inflation and economic growth—and on the justification for dissent; and less on the likely future path of interest rates.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, in the absence of an explicit commitment to a future path for policy rates, communications should highlight uncertainty. As we discuss in detail, in June 2019, with the federal-funds-rate target range at 2.25 to 2.50 percent, the FOMC indicated that there is an even chance the policy rate will be between 1.0 and 4.2 percent by the end of 2021.<sup>8</sup> Taking all of this into account, we see little purpose served in answering questions like, “How many interest-rate increases (or decreases) do you believe are appropriate over the coming year?” Unless there is Committee agreement, so that

5. Throughout this paper, we follow the Federal Reserve’s convention of referring to the FOMC voters as “members” of the Committee, and the combination of voters and nonvoters (the Governors plus all 12 Reserve Bank Presidents) as meeting “participants.”

6. See Blinder (2016).

7. Faust (2016) comes to a similar conclusion.

8. This range reflects the FOMC’s 50-percent confidence interval of plus/minus 1.6 percentage points around the March 2019 SEP median projection of 2.6 percent for the end of 2021. See Reifschneider and Tulip (2017).

the message is coordinated and consistent, having 19 people provide their own version of forward policy-rate guidance is unhelpful.

**Clarifying how policy will react to changing conditions:** When growth, unemployment, inflation, and other financial conditions deviate from what they expect, how will policymakers react systematically and predictably? In the language of monetary economics, what is their *reaction function*? Increasing transparency on this front is a demanding task. To see why, consider that a change in the policy rate could be the consequence of changes in the perception of current or expected future financial and economic conditions or in the desired response to these conditions. Moreover, even if every FOMC participant acts systematically, when perspectives on the economy diverge, new developments can shift the Committee consensus in complex ways.

Throughout this paper, we distinguish between statements about the economic outlook and forward guidance about the policy-rate path. If people understand the central bank's reaction function, then guidance about interest rates is only important when policymakers wish to provide stimulus *beyond* what occurs when people anticipate the central bank's response to news about the economy.

This leads us to focus on the *Summary of Economic Projections* (SEP)—not as a tool to provide explicit information about the future path of the policy rate, but as a way to help understand the Committee's likely reaction to changing conditions. While the SEP is useful for this purpose, we also see considerable room for improvement. Current practice is to publish the linkage among the four variables included in the SEP only with a lag of five years. That is, in the initial release we do not know the inflation- or unemployment-rate projections that are associated with a given interest-rate projection. Consequently, we cannot answer the simple question, "Does a particular FOMC participant project a relatively high interest rate because they believe the equilibrium real interest rate ( $r^*$ ) is high, because they anticipate higher inflation and lower unemployment than their colleagues do, or because they believe in a more aggressive reaction to a shared forecast of these fundamentals?"

To address this clear shortcoming, we recommend that the FOMC immediately publish the "matrix" that links the projections for growth, unemployment, inflation, and interest rates for each FOMC participant. By clarifying where there are agreements and disagreements, the matrix would help observers understand the

Committee's collective reaction function, in part by facilitating inference about the nature and stability of the consensus. Ultimately, a true commitment to transparency also requires identifying respondents by name—information we currently receive only with a *10-year lag*! Associating names with the rows of the matrix not only makes it possible to link projections over time (something we expect observers will do probabilistically once they have the matrix), but also encourages greater discipline among the FOMC participants as they prepare forecasts.

Importantly, even a complete matrix would leave some key aspects of the FOMC reaction function opaque. To enhance transparency and add to credibility, we encourage the Committee to supplement the SEP by publishing the distribution of participant responses to specific scenarios that deviate substantially from the current outlook for the economy and financial conditions. These scenarios would focus on, but not be limited to, prominent tail risks. Collectively, information on the likely reaction to such specific circumstances ought to enhance the SEP and FOMC deliberations and foster a more systematic policy.

**Highlighting policy uncertainty and risks:** Communicating uncertainty about the likely evolution of the economy and the resulting policy path is essential. In our view, limited modifications to current FOMC practice could lead to significant improvements. Again, we look at the SEP. Publication currently occurs in two steps, with indicators of the uncertainty in the projections appearing with the minutes several weeks after the meeting for which they are prepared. This delay leads to what we view as an excessive public focus on the median projection.

We see a simple solution. The FOMC currently includes confidence intervals for its quarterly projections near the end of the complete SEP document. It also publishes participants' subjective assessments of the risks and uncertainty associated with their projections. We urge the Committee to convert the confidence intervals to something closer to a fan chart, move them (along with the subjective risk and uncertainty assessments) to the front of the publication, and release the complete SEP immediately following the FOMC meeting rather than with the minutes three weeks later.

**Recommendations:** With our three objectives in mind, we assess two of the most important elements of FOMC communications: the post-meeting statement and the SEP. We propose simplifying the statement and converting the SEP into a concise *Report on Economic Projections* released with the Chair's press conference immediately

following the meeting; both would refer to the FOMC's foundational statement on longer-run goals.<sup>9</sup>

For the statement, we describe the key elements and a set of principles that should guide its formulation. We also produce two succinct examples that present the relevant information. These examples are readable by a U.S. high-school senior (grade 12).<sup>10</sup>

Over time, we hope that the FOMC will create a process for reaching agreement on a common set of projections and the uncertainty and risks associated with them. Such a consensus projection would provide a strong foundation for improving communications about the reaction function and, when desirable, about a policy-rate commitment.

However, governance challenges make this consensus approach difficult. As a practical, second-best alternative, we propose making three changes designed to convert the SEP into a concise quarterly *Report on Economic Projections*: i) reorder the material, putting the uncertainty charts at the front; ii) include a brief narrative that focuses on uncertainty and risks to the outlook; and iii) include the matrix of individual respondents linking growth, unemployment, inflation, and interest-rate projections. Our very simple version has fewer than 730 words and is readable by a high-school student (grade 9). A slightly more complex version would include a graphical summary of the distribution of participants' responses to various scenarios that deviate markedly from the current economic and financial outlook.

More broadly, a systematic application of our three objectives—simplifying public statements, clarifying how policy will react to changing conditions, and highlighting policy uncertainty and risks—can help streamline other elements of FOMC communications, such as the meeting minutes. Indirectly, these changes also are likely to be a helpful coordinating device for FOMC participants' public commentary. For example, the post-meeting statement and the *Report on Economic Projections* will naturally gain public attention, nudging participants to clarify further their implied reaction functions, to state if and why they disagree with the most recent decision, and to explain the key risks and uncertainties that they see.

9. For the concise *Report on Economic Projections*, we have in mind something like the Bank of England's brief visual summary ("In a Nutshell") of its *Inflation Report*, but constructed around the SEP. The BoE's latest (May 2019) visual summary is available at <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/inflation-report/2019/may-2019/visual-summary>.

10. For reference, the text of this introduction (excluding footnotes) has 2009 words and a Flesch-Kincaid grade level index of 14.3, consistent with the reading level of a second- or third-year college student.

We now turn to a detailed discussion of central-bank communications. We base our recommendations and proposals in large part on comments gathered in the course of two dozen interviews during early 2019. In section 1, we summarize our interview methods and key results. In sections 2, 3, and 4, we discuss central-bank communications in general terms: why central bankers speak, what they should say, and how communications vary in the presence or absence of a policy-rate commitment. In section 5, we turn to FOMC communications that focus on clarifying the reaction function, namely the *Summary of Economic Projections*; first examining the median projections, then discussing the incremental value in publishing the matrix, and addressing how to use existing published materials to communicate uncertainty and risks. The section also briefly addresses scenario analysis as a means to illuminate the reaction function. Section 6 describes our highlighted proposals: the simplification of the FOMC's post-meeting statement (with examples in appendix B) and the reformulation of the SEP as a *Report on Economic Projections* (with an example in appendix C). Section 7 concludes with a brief recitation of our analysis.


## 1. INTERVIEW METHODS AND KEY RESULTS

To help us understand central-bank communications in general, and FOMC communications in particular, we contacted 35 former officials, academics, and market economists. Of these, 24 answered three open-ended questions:<sup>11</sup>

1. What do you see as the primary objectives of FOMC communication?
2. How do you think FOMC communication should evolve over the next five to ten years?
3. What do you view as the greatest challenges to effective FOMC communication?

Figure 1 summarizes the responses.

11. Appendix A reproduces our invitation to participate and lists those who agreed to answer our questions.

**Figure 1. Frequency of Topics Mentioned by Interview Respondents**

Source: Written or oral responses to interviews of 24 former central-bank officials, academics, and market economists in January to March, 2019. See appendix A for a list of those interviews and the dates. We use our judgment to allocate responses across topics.

The most frequently mentioned topic is the desirability of having a clear understanding of policymakers’ reaction function—the systematic element of the central bank’s response to economic and financial developments that drives the expected path of policy. Robert Di Clemente captured the sense of the group when he said, “*If you ask observers, ‘What do you think the Fed would do if it appeared increasingly likely that inflation was going to rise by a percentage point or more in the next year?’ the goal of communications policy ought to be to find strong agreement about the likely course of action.*”<sup>12</sup> Three quarters of those interviewed identified communicating the uncertainty and risks around the expected path of policy as a key topic. As Catherine Mann put it, “*What are the risks? You have to say something about the risks [to the outlook] and then say something about what the implications are for monetary policy.*”

Seventy percent of our interview respondents mentioned the dot plot included in the *Summary of Economic Projections*. This is the visual display of FOMC participants’ policy-rate projections. (In section 5, figure 2, we reproduce the dot plot from the March 2019 SEP.) Comments about the dot plot varied widely, with some interviewees

12. Italicized, attributed quotes that lack references come from our interviews. We include them with the explicit consent of the source. Quotes that are not in italics are from published sources.

advocating its elimination and others suggesting modifications.<sup>13</sup> We agree with Peter Hooper: “*Don’t ditch the dots.*” Indeed, as Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Loretta Mester recently argued, “Omitting the dot plot would not eliminate the uncertainty around the projections, the divergence in views across FOMC participants, or the fact that policymaking always entails learning and recalibration, but it would be a significant step back in transparency.”<sup>14</sup> Our conclusion, based on the detailed analysis in section 5, is that the publication of the dot plot does more good than harm by providing useful information that is difficult to convey in other ways.

Over one half of those we interviewed mentioned the use of transparency as a monetary policy tool. That is, communication itself can be a policy instrument, complementing, or substituting for conventional tools.

The role of communications as a tool is most prominent when it comes to forward guidance regarding a policy-rate commitment, which we discuss in section 4. However, forward guidance also is relevant for balance-sheet policy. And it may be useful to provide contingent guidance regarding longer-run policy strategy, such as the approach that policymakers plan to take when the policy rate hits the effective lower bound. As former Chair Janet Yellen put it, “[t]he FOMC could adopt a set of principles about how it expects to operate in future zero-bound situations...That would provide more information than just changing a couple of words in the statement from a 2-percent inflation target to 2 percent on average.”

A number of respondents mentioned the need to communicate with the public in plain English. Lewis Alexander’s comment is representative, “*Recently, Chair Powell argued in favor of using simple, non-technical, language to describe and explain the key economic concepts and evidence that drive FOMC decisions. I strongly agree.*” Our proposals (in section 6) for a simplified FOMC statement and a concise *Report on Economic Projections* aim in part to address this concern.

Finally, we note that one third of those interviewed mentioned the difficulty created by the “cacophony problem.” As then Governor Powell noted several years ago, “[M]arket participants often say that there are

13. This “mixed assessment” is consistent with the survey findings of Olson and Wessel (2016).

14. See Mester (2019).

too many voices saying too many different things about policy.”<sup>15</sup> Based on the Brookings survey of FOMC communications, Wessel and Olson (2016) report that academicians and market participants want the Chair to speak more and the regional bank presidents to speak less. While placing a large burden on the FOMC Chair, the post-meeting press conference partly addresses this critique: As William Dudley said to us, “[One] advantage of having a press conference every meeting is [it might] tamp down the importance of all the other talk.”

With this background, we turn now to the rationale for monetary policy communications, as well as to the content needed to make it effective.

## 2. WHY CENTRAL BANKERS SPEAK

*“One of the biggest challenges for the FOMC is to reach multiple audiences effectively.”* Richard Berner

For most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, central bankers were infamously silent about their goals and actions. The motto ascribed to the interwar governor of the Bank of England Montague Norman—“never explain, never excuse”—aptly characterized the approach of U.S. central bankers until about 30 years ago. Indeed, just a month after taking office on August 11, 1987, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan remarked:<sup>16</sup>

*“Since becoming a central banker, I have learned to mumble with great incoherence. If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.”*

A key goal of such obfuscation was to ensure *maximum policy discretion*. In their view, for central-bank policy to be optimal, it was always to be free of constraint, including any limits that might arise from prior statements.

Today, however, central bankers have numerous reasons to speak clearly to a wide range of audiences. First, since the 1980s, governments have delegated considerable operational independence to central banks. By overcoming the problem of time consistency, this independence allows central bankers to make credible commitments about future policy that lead to improved economic performance.<sup>17</sup>

15. See Powell (2016).

16. *The Wall Street Journal*, as cited in Geraats (2007).

17. See Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2018) for a primer on time consistency, complete with links to classic references.

To legitimize such a broad delegation of authority, legislatures must hold central banks accountable for achieving their legally mandated goals. This requires considerable transparency. As Paul Tucker put it, “*The first [objective of FOMC communication] is to explain to the public and the public’s representatives in Congress how the Federal Reserve is going about exercising the powers delegated to it by Congress.*”<sup>18</sup>

The requirement for democratic accountability means that the public at large is the most prominent audience for central-bank communication. To be sure, central bankers do not seek to win elections. To be effective, their policy horizon should extend well beyond the electoral cycle. Nevertheless, over the long run, people who lack confidence in the competence and trustworthiness of central-bank officials are unlikely to support the sustained delegation of authority.

Communicating with the voters and their representatives is difficult and requires both the development of a common vocabulary and the willingness of officials to engage in public discourse that focuses on monetary policy. Chairman Bernanke’s appearance on *60 Minutes* (mentioned approvingly by a number of our interview respondents), his lectures to students at George Washington University, and Chairman Powell’s town meetings are the sort of outreach that helps build understanding and support.<sup>19</sup> The *Fed Listens* outreach and review, of which this paper is a part, is another welcome move in this direction.<sup>20</sup>

While technical language barriers can make communicating with the public difficult, communication with financial-market participants is fraught for different reasons. The focus of financial markets on daily news encourages central bankers to comment on high-frequency developments. The result, as Peter Fisher puts it, is that “[*T*]he Fed has a recency bias...always giving the greatest weight to the most recent data.” Yet, giving in to this inclination weakens the long-term focus needed to make central-bank commitments credible.

A related challenge arises from the fact that market participants react almost instantly when policymakers speak and act. Since

18. See also Tucker’s (2018) recent book on the delegation of power to an independent agency in a democratic society. As he notes on page 546, and Brazier (2019) describes, central bankers should think of themselves as “citizens in power, not in charge.”

19. Former Chairman Bernanke’s lectures are available at <https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/educational-tools/lecture-series-origins-and-mission.htm>.

20. For a listing of the 2019 “Fed Listens” events, see <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-fed-listens-events.htm>.

financial conditions play a central role in the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy, central bankers naturally care how people in financial markets receive their messages. As Woodford (2005) notes:

“[C]ommunication strategies improve only through a process of trial and error, even when central banks give considerable attention to the problem of how to tell the public more; for market participants must learn to interpret what the central bank is saying and the central bank must learn to anticipate how its statements will be interpreted.

At the same time, policymakers can become overly concerned with the market reaction to what they say. Jeremy Stein put it succinctly, “*I view the obsession with not surprising the market as counterproductive. The Fed should aim to build a culture and set of norms whereby FOMC members worry less about the short-run market reaction to its statements.*”

### 3. WHAT SHOULD CENTRAL BANKERS SAY?

Both theory and experience have taught central bankers that *limiting policy discretion* can help them achieve their legal mandate. This is the central lesson of the research on time consistency. Viewed in this light, communications that articulate the central bank’s goals and translate them into observable policies buttress the credibility of the commitment to the Federal Reserve’s legal mandate. Over time, consistent matching of words and deeds fosters trust.

Monetary policy is most effective when it influences expectations.<sup>21</sup> Expectations guide the consumption and saving decisions of households, and the investment, production, and pricing decisions of firms. Meanwhile, financial markets translate expectations into long-term interest rates and prices of risky assets. For central bankers, stabilizing inflation expectations is central to stabilizing inflation. In a world with stable inflation expectations, central bankers also have greater flexibility to address temporary shocks that affect growth and unemployment.

Because it is intrinsically forward-looking, modern central banking is all about strategy and commitment. Simply promising to keep inflation low and stable lacks credibility, because policymakers have an incentive to renege on the promise if it is believed. From this perspective, transparency and communications are central components

21. See Coibion and others (2018) and de Haan and Sturm (2019) on the role of central-bank communications in managing expectations.

of a policy framework that—together with legally mandated goals and authorized tools—makes the commitment to price stability (and to other goals, such as maximum sustainable employment) credible. In some circumstances, such as at the effective lower bound for nominal interest rates, communications are among the most powerful central-bank tools for this purpose.<sup>22</sup>

What central bankers need to say depends on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. In addition to guiding expectations, policy affects the economy primarily by altering financial conditions. Central banks are most effective when financial-market participants *anticipate* their responses to economic developments and speed the adjustment of financial conditions.

Helping the public anticipate central-bank behavior starts with an explanation of how central bankers view *current* economic conditions.<sup>23</sup> As a result, officials expend considerable effort explaining how they assess recent economic and financial developments. The Federal Reserve has introduced a range of tools for this purpose, including the publication of indexes that summarize financial conditions and the provision of *nowcasts* that allow for efficient, high-frequency updating of current economic activity estimates.<sup>24</sup>

The most important way to help the public form expectations about monetary policy is to explain how central bankers would alter policy in response to unanticipated economic and financial developments. To be useful, such explanations pre-suppose that policy is systematic, so that there is a reliable link between a set of circumstances and the monetary policy that follows. Explaining how policy would respond to a set of plausible scenarios—a large supply shock that boosts inflation, a deflationary shock that depresses interest rates to the effective lower bound, and so on—can go a long way toward illuminating policymakers’

22. Bernanke (2015) states that “monetary policy is 98 percent talk and only 2 percent action.”

23. With the important exception of Morris and Shin (2002 and 2018), who highlight the potential for private herding, academic researchers typically view the central-bank production of public information as welfare enhancing. See, for example, Svensson (2005) and Woodford (2005). The latter notes that, since policymakers have superior knowledge about their own reaction function, revealing it likely enhances welfare.

24. See, for example, the National Financial Conditions Index (<https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/nfci/index>) and the National Activity Index (<https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/cfnai/index>) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, as well as the GDPNow (<https://www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/research/gdpnow.aspx>) and Nowcasting Report (<https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/nowcast>) of the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and New York.

model of the economy. It also can reveal policymakers' preferences in the face of inevitable short-run tradeoffs among their objectives.

The systematic way in which a central bank responds to developments, both anticipated and unanticipated, constitutes a *monetary policy reaction function*. In line with the modern literature on monetary policy, explaining this reaction function heads the list of communications topics cited in our survey (figure 1).

One classic approach, based on optimal control theory, derives the reaction function by minimizing deviations from the central bank's stabilization goals in a specific model of the economy.<sup>25</sup> However, as Mark Gertler put it, "*We have some idea what [the true model of the economy] might look like, but we don't have a precise sense.*" Since the optimal policy derived from one model may lead to severe underperformance when the model is wrong, policymakers often look to simple, robust rules for guidance. Recent editions of the Federal Reserve's semiannual *Monetary Policy Report* reflect this approach.<sup>26</sup>

Communication is far easier—and more effective in achieving widespread understanding—in the presence of systematic policy. As Charles Plosser notes, "*The unwillingness to give up on discretionary policymaking makes their communications less informative, less transparent, and more complicated than they otherwise might need to be.*" Nevertheless, even when policy is systematic, fundamental uncertainties limit predictability. In addition to uncertainty about the state and model of the economy, central bankers cannot anticipate the shocks that will inevitably arise. While a systematic policy should identify an expected policy path, these uncertainties imply a distribution around that expected path that may be very wide.

Communicating such unavoidable uncertainty may be unwelcome. To quote Dennis Lockhart, "*I don't think the FOMC or the Fed can satisfy financial markets because financial markets are looking for more certainty than can be conveyed and can be communicated.*" Similarly, as Roger Ferguson noted, "*[M]arket participants want to know what the Fed is going to do next. That's the one question the Fed really can't answer with the kind of clarity and certainty that the market would like.*"

25. See, for example, Woodford (2003).

26. Taylor (1993) is the seminal work on simple policy rules. By using a range of models, Cochrane and others (2019) assess the robustness of the simple rules discussed in the Federal Reserve's semiannual *Monetary Policy Report* since July 2017 (see, for example, Board of Governors [2017], pages 36–39).

Yet, revealing the distribution of policy prospects is no less (and can be more) important than illuminating the expected path (figure 1). In most circumstances, central bankers do *not* wish to commit to the expected policy, nor should they. Highlighting uncertainty is one way to demonstrate the absence of a commitment.

To deepen understanding of the limits of the central bank's toolbox, it is useful for communication to highlight circumstances when policy may go beyond a simple rule. For example, it is helpful to explain how the presence of an effective lower bound on nominal interest may prompt policymakers to deviate from the expected policy-rate path to combat deflation risk, even if it means forgoing the usual objectives temporarily.<sup>27</sup> Such *risk management* considerations typically gain force when the probability rises of a high-cost tail event.<sup>28</sup>

Finally, institutional features influence what central bankers need to say. For example, the membership of the Committee changes each year. As former Chair Janet Yellen points out, "*For governance reasons, it is actually very hard to get a committee that is changing over time to bind itself to how it will behave in the future.*" Consequently, to make its ultimate objectives credible, each January, the "new" FOMC re-commits itself (with only minor tinkering) to the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy that informs all policy decisions.

#### 4. COMMUNICATIONS WITH AND WITHOUT A POLICY-RATE COMMITMENT

In thinking about the manner and timing of central-bank communications, it is useful to distinguish two separate regimes. The first, which we label "normal," prevails most of the time when interest rates are positive. The second, which involves a "policy-rate commitment," arises typically if central bankers wish to stimulate the economy further when the policy rate is close to the effective lower bound.

What is common to both regimes is the need to communicate the central bank's mandate (e.g., price stability and maximum sustainable employment). In addition, because private agents are forward-looking and because policy's impact on the economy occurs only with a lag,

27. For a discussion of risk management in monetary policy, see Greenspan (2004).

28. The development of tools to anticipate such tail events—such as GDP at Risk—facilitates such a risk-management approach. See Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2017).

communications must be forward-looking as well. Thus, policymakers need to make clear the expected policy path that arises from the central bank's reaction function.

In the normal regime, it is essential to convey the uncertainty regarding the path of the fundamentals that drive the reaction function. This is what officials mean when they describe policy as "data-dependent."<sup>29</sup> As new observations arrive, policymakers update their perceptions of the state of the economy and financial conditions, as well as of key unobservable variables in their economic model, and adjust the likely path of policy accordingly.<sup>30</sup>

In this setting, forward-looking communication—such as economic or interest-rate projections—is unavoidably "Delphic" in character.<sup>31</sup> Regardless of what anyone might think, it emphatically is not a commitment to a specific interest-rate path. Indeed, for communications to be effective, the central bank must persuade outside observers that, when conditions deviate from forecasts, the policy path will too.

In this normal regime, public understanding of the policy reaction function is sufficient for the central bank to deliver adequate stimulus to the economy when inflation falls below target, output falls short of potential, or unemployment exceeds its equilibrium level. In contrast, at the effective lower bound, delivering more stimulus than conventional tools permit may require a commitment to keep the policy rate "low for longer."<sup>32</sup> Under these circumstances, communication becomes a policy tool, altering financial conditions and economic prospects when policy-rate changes cannot.

Going beyond a mere Delphic forecast, such an "Odyssean" commitment aims metaphorically to tie policymakers to the mast. The purpose of such a pledge to keep policy rates low is to reduce long-term interest rates and term *premia* that affect financial conditions more broadly. In this commitment regime, uncertainty about the policy-rate path is naturally lower than in the normal regime.

Provided the commitment is credible, theory suggests that such "forward guidance" will be extremely powerful. In some benchmark macroeconomic models, this gives rise to a "forward guidance puzzle" in which a commitment to a one-off temporary stimulus has greater

29. Williams (2019) is a recent, representative example.

30. See Clarida (2018) for how data may be used to update estimates of the real rate of interest ( $r^*$ ) or unemployment rate ( $u^*$ ) that prevail in long-run equilibrium.

31. See Campbell and others (2012) for the introduction of the terms "Delphic" and "Odyssean" in characterizing forward-looking FOMC communications.

32. See, for example, Reifschneider and Williams (2000).

impact today the further in the future its implementation.<sup>33</sup> However, these models assume a degree of credibility and time consistency that is virtually never achievable. Indeed, where the voting members of the policy committee frequently change—as the FOMC does every January—it is nearly impossible to see how the current committee could provide credible commitments of interest-rate actions in the distant future.

In addition to the limits imposed by its governance structure, the credibility of a monetary policy committee's interest-rate commitment depends on the central bank's policy framework. Suppose for example, that inflation has fallen short of policymakers' target for some time. In a conventional inflation-targeting framework where "bygones are bygones," promising to keep interest rates low well after inflation rises to its target is likely to be less convincing than in an "average inflation" targeting regime where policymakers explicitly account for past misses.<sup>34</sup>

In practice, policymakers make two types of Odyssean commitments: *date-contingent* and *state-contingent*.<sup>35</sup> A date-contingent promise is relatively easy to communicate: policymakers simply say that they will keep the policy rates at or near the effective lower bound for a specified period of calendar time. Far from making policy data-dependent, a date-contingent promise is equivalent to announcing that policymakers are willing to short-circuit their reaction function, ignoring economic and financial news until the commitment expires. If credible, date-contingent promises can have a powerful impact on financial conditions, as they mute private reactions to economic news, thus reducing volatility.<sup>36</sup> However, as conditions evolve, a central bank may face an incentive to renege.

Unlike date-contingent commitments, state-contingent pledges tend to reinforce the reaction function, thus helping to underpin credibility. In an inflation-targeting regime, for example, a common approach is to commit to a low policy-rate path until key goals are satisfied: inflation (or inflation expectations) rises to its target,

33. See McKay and others (2016).

34. The latter regime is "history dependent" in the sense that Woodford (2005) deems necessary for optimal policy.

35. The description and analysis of date- and state-contingent commitments draws heavily on Feroli and others (2017).

36. By using a cross-country dataset, Ehrmann and others (2019) find that date-contingent promises with a short horizon (less than or equal to 1.5 years) actually increase the responsiveness to news and are not effective in reducing forecaster disagreements.

unemployment sinks to its equilibrium rate, or both. In a targeting regime that accounts for past misses, the commitment could go further: keep the policy rate low until *average* inflation over a specified period reaches its target.<sup>37</sup>

Several factors favor state-contingent commitments over the procedurally simpler date-contingent variety. First, they are less likely to strain credibility because they tend to amplify, rather than mute, the reaction function. Second, because they do not blunt private agents' responses to economic news, the transition to a normal regime—one without a policy-rate commitment—is likely to be smoother. Once policy moves away from the effective lower bound, the case for state-contingent over date-contingent commitments becomes even stronger. Third, as Feroli and others (2017) highlight, observers tend to focus disproportionately on the time-based aspects of communications even when policymakers seek to qualify the commitment.

To summarize our discussion thus far, effective central-bank communication conveys a sense of policymakers' reaction function and a clear understanding of the uncertainty associated with the path of both the economy and policy. And it conveys the desired messages in simple, widely accessible, language. Through its various communications tools (discussed in appendix D), the FOMC is already working hard to meet these goals. The post-meeting statement and the Summary of Economic Projections are two of the most important communications tools. When we come to our specific recommendations in section 6, we propose some principles for simplifying and making the statement more informative. We also suggest using components of the SEP to construct a timely and concise *Report on Economic Projections*.

Before that, however, we turn to a discussion of tools for clarifying the reaction function, with a focus on the SEP. In our view, the SEP in its current form has been useful both in the presence and in the absence of a policy-rate commitment. But, as we will explain, we believe that a straightforward reorganization of existing published material—including some modest additions and changes in timing—could bring further significant improvements.

37. See Yellen (2018) for a brief discussion of alternative targeting frameworks, including price-level targeting and nominal GDP targeting, as well as average inflation targeting. Mertens and Williams (2019) analyze the benefits of targeting average inflation and the price level for reducing the constraint of the effective lower bound. Gust and others (2017) show that an asymmetric loss function can result in a “low-for-longer” commitment.

## 5. CLARIFYING THE REACTION FUNCTION

The most prominent FOMC communications tool that links the economic outlook and the policy-rate choice—the reaction function—is the SEP. The complete SEP also illuminates policymakers’ uncertainty about the outlook and the policy path. In this section, we explore what can be learned from the current version of the SEP, the extent to which additional information about the participants would enhance understanding of the Committee’s reaction function, and how the addition of scenario analysis could add further to this understanding.

### 5.1 What we Learn from the SEP

*“[I]f properly understood, the dot plot can be a constructive element of comprehensive policy communication.”* Federal Reserve Board Chairman Jerome Powell, March 8, 2019.<sup>38</sup>

In 2012, five years after they began its publication, the FOMC added explicit information on the federal-funds rate to the SEP. At the time, the Committee probably hoped that displaying the breadth of support for keeping interest rates close to zero would bolster its “low-for-longer” commitment. This is surely no longer the case.


Today, what is the role of the SEP in the FOMC’s communications framework? What can we learn from the release as it exists, and how might that information be enhanced and supplemented to meet the objectives of improving communication?

The current form of the SEP presents the median projections of economic growth, inflation, and unemployment for the next two or three years, as well as a plot of the policy-rate projections for all of the FOMC participants (without identifying them). Financial-market participants and the media focus intently on these “dot plots,” like the one released following the March 2019 FOMC meeting and reproduced in figure 2.

A bit like pathologists analyzing a biopsy, “dotologists” study these plots in an effort to divine the intentions of policymakers. When will the next policy-rate move come? Will it be an increase or decrease? How many changes are coming over the next year? Over the next two years? The questions go on and on. The publication of the dot plot, and the questions it generates, has spawned a cottage industry of experts much like that which sought to identify actual policy shifts before the FOMC began to announce them in 1994.

38. See <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20190308a.htm>

**Figure 2. FOMC Participants' Assessments of Appropriate Monetary Policy: Midpoint of Target Range or Target Level for the Federal-funds Rate (End of Period), March 20, 2019**



Source: Copied directly from figure 2, Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (<https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20190320.pdf>), March 19–20, 2019.

In examining the dots, it is important to understand what they are and what they are not. Bernanke (2016) explains that they are neither a policy commitment nor an unconditional forecast. Moreover, the dots themselves do not convey the considerable level of uncertainty associated with each individual's projections. Instead, the dots are a collection of projections from all FOMC participants (voters and nonvoters) "based on individual views of 'appropriate monetary policy'." As Bernanke explains, someone with views that clearly differ from the consensus would base their projections on their own views, not on what they believed is most likely to happen. Provided FOMC participants behave systematically, if we knew each individual's projections, then we could recover their approximate (implicit) reaction function. That is, the current procedure generates much more useful data than an alternative in which survey respondents would provide their view of the most likely future path of policy and the economy.<sup>39</sup>

We now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the SEP, starting with a look at the median projections. This information, including

39. There are other ways to obtain useful information on the Committee's reaction function. For example, several interview respondents suggested that the FOMC publish how policy is likely to change in various scenarios. That is, provide each participant a common set of paths for growth, unemployment, and inflation, and ask what they think the appropriate policy-rate path would be in each case. We return to this idea at the end of section 5.

interest-rate projections, is available quarterly since 2012. Next, we examine the incremental value of having the matrix of linked individual projections for unemployment, inflation, and the policy rate. As of this writing, the FOMC has published this matrix—without the names of the FOMC participants—only for 2012 and 2013. The revelation of the names is set to begin with a 10-year lag in 2022. Finally, we look at uncertainty, with respect to both the future state of the economy and the policy rate.

### 5.1.1 The Median SEP

*“The SEP provides useful quantitative information about the FOMC’s reaction function, and, in particular, why the projections of future interest-rate changes.”* Bernanke (2016).

To the extent that the dot plot is merely a collection of projections, the format in which it first appears would seem to limit its usefulness. Until five years after its initial release, the SEP provides no means to connect the inflation, unemployment, and interest-rate forecasts of individual respondents. The reported medians (and ranges) need not reflect any particular FOMC participant’s view or reaction function. Moreover, the mix of individuals shifts from year to year, as both Governors and Reserve Bank Presidents change. In addition, only five of the 12 Presidents vote at a time, but the dots do not distinguish voters and nonvoters. So, one might be skeptical about using the information in the SEP to construct a coherent story about the FOMC’s likely reactions to changing circumstances.

On closer inspection, however, we see that the medians contain very useful information. To come to this conclusion, we look at the 30 SEP publications from January 2012 to June 2019, collecting data on the median values for the policy interest rate, inflation (as measured by the core PCE price index), and unemployment.<sup>40</sup> Each SEP has forecasts for three or four years, resulting in a panel dataset with 107 observations. Treating all these as if they came from a single (representative) policymaker, we estimate a simple Taylor rule where the policy interest rate ( $i$ ) is set equal to the short-run equilibrium real rate of interest ( $r^*$ ) for a given year, plus current inflation ( $\pi$ ), plus

40. In 2012, there were five SEPs, one more than the quarterly frequency in subsequent years.

a coefficient ( $\alpha$ ) times the inflation gap ( $\pi - \pi^*$ ) and another coefficient ( $\beta$ ) times the unemployment gap ( $U - U^*$ ):<sup>41</sup>

$$i_{t,s} = r_k^* + \pi_t + \alpha(\pi_t - \pi^*) - \beta(U_{t,s} - U_{t,s}^*) + \varepsilon_{t,s}, \quad (1)$$

where the subscript  $t$  denotes the month-year of the SEP (e.g., March 2018),  $k$  is the year of the SEP (e.g., 2018), and  $s$  is the year for which the projection is made (e.g., 2018, 2019, 2020). The final term in equation (1),  $\varepsilon_{t,s}$ , is a mean zero, constant variance error. By including year-fixed effects, we are able to estimate the short-run real interest rate each year ( $r_k^*$ ).

Estimating equation (1) yields several interesting results. First, the SEP-implied short-run reactions to changes in inflation ( $1 + \hat{\alpha}$ ) and unemployment ( $\hat{\beta}$ ) are 2.0 and 0.6, respectively.<sup>42</sup> That is, for each percentage point the median inflation projection lies above or below the target of 2 percent, the median policy-rate projection moves by nearly *two and one half percentage points*. The SEP medians suggest far less sensitivity to the unemployment gap, with the policy rate moving by only about half a percentage point for each percentage point that projected unemployment moves relative to the estimate of the equilibrium rate ( $U^*$ ). While the estimated ratio of  $(1 + \alpha)$  to  $\beta$  is surprisingly high, this regression fits reasonably well, accounting for nearly 75 percent of the variation in the panel of median interest-rate projections.

Second, estimates of the implied short-run equilibrium real interest rate follow an interesting evolution. After adjusting for the 2-percent inflation target, we can compare our estimates of  $r_k^*$  with the longer-run policy-rate projections reported in the SEP, which we label  $r_l^*$ . Figure 3 shows the results of this exercise. The solid line is the estimate of the annual short-run  $r_k^*$  computed from the Taylor rule (recall that this is the estimate for the year of the SEP publication). The shaded area depicts a 95-percent confidence interval around these short-run estimates. The dashed line is the median value of


41. Since we use projections for the core PCE price index, the inflation objective  $\pi^*$  is equal to 2. To calculate the unemployment gap, we use the median of the “longer-run” unemployment rate in each SEP release as our measure of  $U^*$ .

42. The exact parameter estimates (with robust t-ratios in parentheses) are  $(\hat{\alpha}) = 1.02$  (3.85) and  $(\hat{\beta}) = 0.55$  (3.29). Standard errors computed by using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) procedure are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.

the longer run  $r_l^*$  (the average SEP median federal-funds rate in the longer run published that year minus the 2-percent inflation objective). The dotted lines show the range of the average minimum and maximum projections for  $r_l^*$  for the year.

Looking at the figure, we see that the short-run  $r_k^*$  starts at a level below zero in 2012 and fluctuates in a range between minus one quarter and plus one half of one percent. That is, the FOMC’s recent forecasts for interest rates, inflation, and unemployment are consistent with a short-run  $r_k^*$  of about  $-0.2$  percent. Over the same period, the SEP median longer-run equilibrium real rate  $r_l^*$  declines consistently. Starting above 2 percent (with a range from 1.25 to 2.5 percent) in 2012, the 2019 estimate of the contemporaneous longer-run real interest rate is between  $-0.1$  and  $1.5$  percent, with a median of  $0.65$  percent.<sup>43</sup>

**Figure 3. SEP-implied Short-run and Longer-run Equilibrium Real Interest Rates ( $r_k^*$  and  $r_l^*$ ), 2012–19**



Source: Data are from the 31 published SEPs from January 2012 to June 2019.

Note: Estimates of the short-run equilibrium real interest rate (solid line) are the time-fixed effects in equation (1). The shaded area is 1.96 times the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard error of each year’s estimate. Estimates of the longer-run equilibrium real interest rate (dashed line) are the average of the median longer-run nominal federal-funds-rate projections in the SEP for the year, less the 2-percent long-run inflation objective. The dotted lines show the range of average minimum and maximum projections for  $r_l^*$  for the year.

43. We note that the March 2019 estimate from the Laubach and Williams (2015) model published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) (<https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/rstar>) is 0.65, roughly equal to the average of the median from the March and June 2019 SEPs.

This brief casual analysis of the data suggests to us that, even as currently published, the SEP medians are quite informative. They help us to sketch the rough outlines of how the Committee might react as inflation and unemployment change and they highlight the evolving perception of what is neutral. Perhaps surprisingly, even over the turbulent period of the past seven years, the pattern is relatively stable: the implied levels of the short-run (and longer-run) equilibrium real rate of interest change gradually as new data prompts FOMC participants to update their views.

### 5.1.2 The Incremental Value of the Matrix

*“One recommendation would be to adopt the so-called matrix approach for the SEP in order to reinforce the link between the economic forecast and the policy outlook for each individual member.”* David Greenlaw.

Given the value of the medians, what is the incremental information of publishing the matrix that would allow us to connect the inflation, growth, unemployment, and policy-rate projections for each individual FOMC participant? The answer is that it can help observers assess when the Committee median or consensus might shift.

Unsurprisingly, the median view in a group can be unstable. That is, even if all the participants follow a systematic, model-based, policy strategy, the identity of the median participant (and hence the properties of the median reaction function) can shift. To see why, consider the following extended example, in which the participants of a monetary policy committee fall into three distinct groups. They share much in common: their inflation target is 2 percent, their estimate of the equilibrium level of unemployment is 4 percent and their estimate of the short-run equilibrium real interest rate is 1 percent. Where they differ is in the weight they attach to the inflation and unemployment gaps, and to financial stability concerns in their reaction functions. Specifically, assume that each group employs a variant of the following Taylor rule in equation (1):

$$i = r^* + \pi + \alpha(\pi - \pi^*) - \beta(U - U^*) + \gamma FS, \quad (2)$$

where the added term,  $FS$ , is a financial stability indicator (such as financial system leverage or housing prices) which equals 0

or 1.<sup>44</sup> The values of the parameters in (2) distinguish the three groups, as shown in table 1:

Group A reacts to unemployment movements above all else, Group B has a balanced approach, albeit one explicitly integrating financial stability considerations, and Group C is the mirror image of Group A, focusing exclusively on inflation deviations from the target. These differences could arise from diverse perspectives on the central bank's loss function, variation in the underlying model of the economy, or some combination of the two.

Next, assume the median group controls policy outcomes so long as its members are able to obtain support from members of at least one other group. And a group is willing to vote with the median if the result is less than 50 basis points from their preferred policy choice; otherwise, they dissent.

Consider two scenarios in which the financial stability indicator is 0 or 1. In each scenario, we look at examples where the only thing that varies is the unemployment rate. Table 2 displays the results of this exercise. Starting with the top panel, where  $FS$  is zero, Group B—the balanced group—is *always* the median (the shaded cells in the table). In addition, no group prefers a policy rate that is more than 25 basis points from the median, so the vote is always unanimous.

**Table 1. Policy Rules for Three Distinct Groups**

<i>Group</i>	$\alpha$	$\beta$	$\gamma$
A	0.0	1.0	0.0
B	0.5	0.5	0.5
C	1.0	0.0	0.0

44. We see the inclusion of a more graduated financial stability indicator as a potentially realistic addition to the reaction function. For example, in prepared remarks delivered on May 14, 2019, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Esther George warned that “lower interest rates might fuel asset-price bubbles, create financial imbalances, and ultimately a recession.” See George (2019).

**Table 2. Desired Policy Rate by Group**

<i>Scenario I. Financial Stability Indicator = 0</i>						
Cases	<i>State of the Economy</i>			<i>Desired Policy Rate</i>		
	$\pi$	$U$	$FS$	<i>Group A</i>	<i>Group B</i>	<i>Group C</i>
1	2	3.5	0	3.50	3.25	3.00
2	2	4.0	0	3.00	3.00	3.00
3	2	4.5	0	2.50	2.75	3.00
<i>Scenario II. Financial Stability Indicator = 1</i>						
Cases	<i>State of the Economy</i>			<i>Desired Policy Rate</i>		
	$\pi$	$U$	$FS$	<i>Group A</i>	<i>Group B</i>	<i>Group C</i>
1	2	3.5	1	3.50	3.75	<b>3.00</b>
2	2	4.0	1	3.00	<b>3.50</b>	3.00
3	2	4.5	1	<b>2.50</b>	3.25	3.00

Note: The shaded cells denote the median voting-group policy rate, and numbers in bold italics denote cases where a group will dissent.

The bottom panel of table 2 displays the results when financial stability is a concern ( $FS$  equals one). Now, in every case, Group B prefers a policy rate that is 50 basis points higher than in the absence of a financial stability concern. As a result, Group B is *never* the median. Instead, the median fluctuates between Group A and Group C (or both). Also, there will be dissents in every case (bold italics). In case 1, Group C dissents because they set policy with a primary focus on inflation, which is at the target. In case 2, Group B dissents because their model implies tighter policy in response to financial stability risks. Finally, in case 3, Group A dissents because of their primary concern for unemployment.

This example highlights the challenge of deducing the reaction function for a *committee* even if all of the members are following systematic policies. Doing so requires understanding both the entire array of reaction functions, as well as when each group is likely to carry the day. To put it slightly differently, in order to understand how the committee will react to incoming information, we need to know how each individual's desired policy rate will change so that we can predict the voting pattern and assess where the consensus is likely to emerge. Information in the matrix, especially with projections linked across time, would make this possible.

**Table 3. Monetary Policy Reaction Functions based on SEP Matrix, September 2012**

2015 Funds Rate Range	Estimated short- run $r^*$	$\hat{\alpha}$	$\hat{\beta}$	$R^2$	Average $U^*$	Average long-run $r_l^*$	Number of participants
0.0 to 1.0 percent	-1.15 (11.48)	-0.90 (3.51)	0.28 (5.05)	0.42	5.39	1.88	10
1.5 to 2.5 percent	-0.18 (0.62)	2.10 (2.01)	0.52 (2.94)	0.56	5.76	2.20	5
3.5 to 4.5 percent	1.69 (3.10)	-0.35 (0.07)	-1.43 (3.73)	0.58	5.88	2.31	4
Full sample	0.14 (0.62)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.75 (5.61)	0.38	5.59	2.07	19

Notes: The table reports estimates of a simple Taylor rule:  $i_j = r_j^* + \pi_j + \alpha(\pi_j - \pi^*) - \beta(U_j - U_j^*)$ , where  $j$  represents the row of the matrix of projections for groups distinguished by their three-plus year projection of the policy rate. Each participant provides four projections—2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015—so the number of observations in each sample equals the number of participants times four. Numbers in parentheses are OLS  $t$ -ratios.

With existing public information, we are unable to estimate individual policy reaction functions with any precision. Instead, to sketch what we might learn from the full matrix, we take the sparse information that is available and look for groups that might have similar systemic responses to changing economic conditions. The September 2012 SEP reports the matrix for 19 participants with projections through 2015: this gives us 76 observations. We divide the data into three groups based on the participants' 2015 federal-funds-rate projections: (1) the 2015 federal-funds rate will be between 0.0 to 1.0 percent, (2) the 2015 federal-funds rate will be between 1.5 to 2.5 percent, and (3) the 2015 federal-funds rate will be between 3.5 to 4.5 percent. Taking these groups, we estimate three simple Taylor rules. The results are in table 3. Only the estimates for the second group make sense. The others suggest participants would *lower* the real interest rate in reaction to *higher* inflation—that is,  $\hat{\alpha}$  is negative! Clearly, the existing information is insufficient for us to come to any reasonable conclusions about individual reaction functions.

As we mentioned in the introduction, a true commitment to transparency requires timely publication of the matrix *together with the participants' names*. Nevertheless, even without the names and without links across SEPs, new information-processing techniques likely will allow experts to extract more information from the matrix of projections. We would not be surprised to see a cottage industry of specialists applying natural-language-processing methods to policy-related speeches or writings in order to deduce the names while using machine-learning techniques to identify relatively stable groups with common reaction functions. While the results of such exercises can help discipline policymakers (increasing the incentive to act systematically), it seems better to preempt such private policy-discovery efforts, avoid the deadweight loss to society that they represent, and enhance the transparency of the SEP directly by providing the matrix with the names at the outset.<sup>45</sup>

### 5.1.3 Interest-Rate Policy Uncertainty

*“I believe the current emphasis on the medians of these disparate projections in Fed publications and explanations also works to undermine the emphasis on uncertainty.”* Donald L. Kohn.<sup>46</sup>

We now turn to the difficult but essential task of communicating uncertainty. Officials may be concerned that effective communication of uncertainty would underscore how little they actually know. However, it is important that the public understand the challenges of setting monetary policy. Above all, there should be a common appreciation that, as a result of the considerable uncertainties, a key feature of effective policy is a willingness to entertain differing assessments, correcting errors quickly as new information arrives.<sup>47</sup> As Mervyn King emphasized to us, *“Talking very openly about the degree of ignorance is crucial. Explain what we don’t know and don’t apologize for it: this is being honest and, frankly, no one else knows either.”*

45. Calomiris and Mamaysky (2019) highlight the incentive effects that natural-language-processing (NLP) techniques can induce by enhancing transparency. NLP techniques are already being widely used in the analysis of central-bank behavior. As noted in appendix D, Hansen and others (2018) use NLP to assess the impact on FOMC deliberations of publishing the transcripts. Prattle (2018), a private vendor, employs NLP to assess the sentiment of policymakers at several central banks.

46. See Kohn (2019).

47. Faust (2016) also notes the desirability of explaining the role of errors in making policy.

Fortunately, the FOMC compiles and publishes substantial information on uncertainty; but does little to attract attention to this valuable work. Based on the analysis of Federal Reserve Board economists, table 2 in the complete SEP that is currently released with the FOMC meeting minutes includes estimates of error ranges (measured as the root-mean-squared historical prediction error) for projections of real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, inflation, *and* the short-term interest rate.<sup>48</sup> Since this appears three weeks after the initial SEP release, only die-hard devotees consume this critical information.

To see how informative these error ranges are, consider the information included with the March 19–20, 2019 meeting minutes, available at <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>. There we learn that, for the unemployment rate, the median projection two years ahead is 3.9 percent, with an error range of plus or minus 1.7 percentage points. This tells us that, given historical experience, there is a 70-percent chance that, at the end of 2021, the unemployment rate will be between 2.2 and 5.7 percent. For inflation the median is 2.0 percent with an error range of plus or minus 1.1 percentage points, so the confidence interval goes from 0.9 to 3.1 percent. (For GDP growth the median projection is 1.8 percent with a root-mean-squared error of 1.9 percent; that is, the 70-percent confidence interval extends from -0.1 to +3.7 percent).

Uncertainty regarding the future level of unemployment and inflation (and real growth) translates directly into uncertainty about the path of the policy rate. Here, again, the FOMC is remarkably transparent about the unavoidable lack of precision. In March 2019, the error range for the 2021 projection of the short-term interest rate is plus or minus 2.5 percentage points. Given the median projection of 2.6 percent, this implies that the Committee believes there is a 70-percent chance that, at the end of 2021, the target interest rate will be between 0.1 and 5.1 percent. If the risks are symmetrical, that implies there is at least a 15-percent chance of returning to the zero lower bound in the next two years. (The 50-percent confidence interval for the policy rate over this same two-year horizon is plus or minus 1.6 percentage points).


Since 2017, the FOMC has also published a chart in the full SEP that helps visualize the uncertainty in the interest-rate path. Figure 4

48. See David Reifschneider and Peter Tulip (2017). Levy (2019a and 2019b) also recently proposed highlighting this material.

reproduces the version included with the March 19–20, 2019 minutes. This fan chart makes clear that, while the median suggests little change in the policy rate over the next 2-plus years (in white), there is considerable uncertainty that increases with the forecast horizon.

**Figure 4. Uncertainty in the March 2019 Projections of the Federal-funds Rate**


(with 70% confidence interval), 2019 to 2021



Source: Figure 5, Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, March 19–20, 2019 on the FOMC’s section of the Federal Reserve Board website (<https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>).

**Figure 5. Uncertainty in the Two-year-ahead Projections of the Federal-funds Rate**

(quarterly with 70% confidence interval), 2012-March 2019



Source: Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, 2012 to 2019; table 5 in Reifschneider and Tulip (2017); and authors’ calculations.

To underscore the value of these published indicators of uncertainty, we examine the information from all 30 SEPs through March 2019 and combine it with the error ranges computed by Reifschneider and Tulip (2017) to generate a history of the uncertainty in the FOMC's two-year ahead policy-rate projections. Figure 5 displays the result. The black line is the two-year ahead median, while the gray area is the 70-percent confidence interval. Note that "two years ahead" is only an approximation, since the projection is always for the end of the calendar year that is two years ahead. We show the projections as of each publication date. For example, we plot the March, June, September, and December 2012 projections for the end of 2014 as four consecutive points in 2012. Specifically, the December 2012 median projection for the end of 2014 was 0.13 percent, with error bands ranging from -1.81 percent to +2.07 percent. (The fact that "two years ahead" is closer to December than it is to March explains much of the jagged pattern in the confidence interval: uncertainty declines as the forecast horizon shortens).

In our view, this information about the uncertainty in the projections is severely underutilized. Indeed, we believe that with a bit of work, it is possible to convert the SEP published with the meeting minutes (fan charts and all) into a concise *Report on Economic Projections* that would be a centerpiece of the FOMC's communications framework.

## 5.2 Further Mechanisms to Clarify the Reaction Function

Even with the names, the matrix alone is unlikely to clarify some important aspects of the Committee's reaction function. For this purpose, we also need information about how policy would adjust in circumstances that deviate markedly from the current economic outlook. For example, understanding how the central bank will respond to adverse tail events—episodes that have low probability but high severity—requires additional information. A straightforward way to obtain this information is to supply FOMC participants with specific scenarios and ask them to provide their preferred interest-rate and balance-sheet reactions. Such a procedure is analogous to the hypothetical portfolio exercises that bank supervisors use to assess the relative comparability of institutions' risk models.<sup>49</sup> As we previously

49. For a discussion of the use of hypothetical portfolio exercises in assessing bank risk models, see Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2014).

mentioned, the addition of scenario analysis as a complement to the FOMC's existing communications framework is also consistent with the suggestions of several interviewees.

To see how this might work, consider asking FOMC participants how they would react to a repeat of the 2008–09 episode following the Lehman collapse or to the severely adverse scenarios in the annual bank stress tests (the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review).<sup>50</sup> A compilation of the resulting projections for interest rates and the balance sheet would effectively disclose the conditional consensus response. That is, for the economic and financial conditions in each scenario, the distribution of participants' answers reveals critical aspects of the *Committee's* reaction function, not just their own.

A second example would be to ask FOMC participants how they would respond to a large deviation of trend inflation from the stated longer-run goal of 2 percent. A specific scenario might consider a persistent one-percentage-point rise in the rate of increase of the personal consumption expenditure price index. How quickly, by how much, and for how long is the Committee likely to adjust the path of the policy rate? These responses would be an important supplement to the existing summary of the participants' views on the outlook and appropriate policy that is currently in the SEP.

## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

Returning to where we started, three objectives guide our proposals for further improving FOMC communications: simplifying public statements, clarifying how policy will react to changing conditions, and highlighting policy uncertainty and risks. To illustrate the application of these objections and how they help further improve communications practices, we provide examples of a re-formulated post-meeting statement and a concise *Report on Economic Projections*, both of which refer to the FOMC's foundational statement on longer-run goals.

### 6.1 Simplifying the Post-Meeting Statement

To address the general public and their elected representatives as well as financial markets, the FOMC must speak in plain language. A simple and easily readable post-meeting statement will, in our view,

50. See <https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/ccar.htm>

increase credibility and accountability, and improve the effectiveness of policy. It would form the basis of what Haldane and McMahon (2018) call a “layering” strategy. Layering aims to transmit key information about the outlook and policy plans at *multiple levels of complexity* and takes advantage of the variety of communications channels to reach different audiences. The new statement would serve as the simplest and most broadly accessible communications device, with other tools (like the Chair’s press conference, the SEP, meeting minutes, participants’ speeches, and the *Monetary Policy Report* to Congress) providing details aimed at audiences with specific interests and greater expertise.

With this objective in mind, we took a careful look at recent post-meeting statements. To simplify them, we recommend focusing on just three elements:

- the statement of the decision, including votes for and against,
- the rationale for the decision, including the reason for dissents,
- and a discussion of uncertainties and risks to the outlook.

For each of these, the FOMC should include information on both the policy-rate target and the balance sheet.<sup>51</sup>

We propose three principles to guide the drafting of the statement. First, keep it readable. In practical terms, we suggest aiming for the reading level of a high-school senior (grade 12) and capping complexity at what is readable by a second-year college student (grade 14). Based on standard measures of readability, this means keeping sentences short and avoiding words that have more than two syllables.

Second, to quote David Wessel, “*The FOMC should put more emphasis on its start-of-year statement of goals and objectives and refer to that when it is making policy decisions.*” That is, each post-meeting statement should explicitly link the decision to the Committee’s longer-run goals.

Third, we encourage the FOMC to adopt the first person plural in its communication. As we discuss in our introductory comments, the FOMC would benefit from practices that foster group accountability. For this reason, we believe it would be wise to drop references to the “Committee,” as if it exists independent of the people involved, and substitute “we,” “us,” and “our.” Where an FOMC participant wishes to express dissent, the substitute would be “I.”

51. Blinder (2016) provides an alternative formulation of the FOMC statement that included the first two elements we propose.

As examples, by using the information in the original statements and in the minutes released three weeks later, we constructed alternative statements for the December 2017 and March 2019 meetings. Both meetings were associated with an SEP, and the first one included dissents. The new versions, as well as the originals, are in appendix B.

As table 4 shows, our alternative versions are much simpler than the originals. And, despite their brevity, we believe that they contain additional relevant information. Using the Flesch-Kincaid measure of readability, the indicative grade level of the original statements exceeds 16, consistent with the reading ability of a fourth-year college (or a post-graduate) student.<sup>52</sup> For December 2017, the last time there was a dissent, our alternative statement has a Flesch-Kincaid grade-level index of 12.8. The alternative statement for March 2019 has an index of 10.6.

It may not always be feasible to achieve this level of readability. However, in order to allow the broadest possible audience access to the Federal Reserve's key policy decisions, it is worth the effort to craft post-meeting statements that are easy to read. To reiterate, this would be the simplest layer of a multi-layered strategy that uses other tools for more nuanced and complex communication.<sup>53</sup>

**Table 4. Comparing the Original and Alternative Versions of Two FOMC Statements**

<i>Statement Date</i>	<i>Number of Words</i>		<i>Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level</i>	
	<i>Original</i>	<i>Alternative</i>	<i>Original</i>	<i>Alternative</i>
December 2017	427	290	16.4	12.8
March 2019	303	309	16.4	10.6

Note: The number of words and the grade-level readability index exclude the paragraph that reports the vote. We compute the readability index by using the calculator at <http://www.readabilityformulas.com/free-readability-formula-tests.php>. Both the original and alternative statements are in appendix 2.

52. Since the inception of the statement in February 1994, the median grade level is 16.6 with an interquartile range of 15.5 to 17.5. We discuss the evolution and context of FOMC post-meeting statements in appendix D, which includes a time-series plot of the Flesch-Kincaid grade level and the number of words for each statement (see figure D2 in appendix D).

53. In a three-page paper that uses only one-syllable words, Samuelson (1979) explains the fallacy of maximizing geometric mean returns in long sequences. The paper highlights the linguistic tradeoff between simplicity and precision and emphasizes the importance of setting a realistic goal for readability. Even with that caveat, however, the scope for simplifying the FOMC's post-meeting statements is notable.

To help explain its actions, we also suggest that the FOMC consider streamlining the meeting minutes. Currently, following long-standing historical precedent, the structure of the minutes follows the chronology of the meeting. As a result, this lengthy document places all of the key material at the end. An alternative structure that aims to highlight the Committee's decisions, rationale, and agreements or disagreements would completely reverse this order. It would begin with the Committee Policy Action (including balance-sheet decisions), followed by the section entitled Participants' Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook (including any discussion of balance-sheet issues). The list of those attending the meeting, comments from the Staff regarding developments in financial markets, and Staff reviews of the economic and financial situations would be moved to the end, possibly in an appendix.<sup>54</sup>

Finally, in order to avoid undue emphasis on specific phrases or words, we suggest that the structure of the FOMC statement be flexible, changing relatively often. The threshold for change should be very low. One welcome side benefit would be to reduce the value of tracking changes in the statement wording.

## 6.2 An FOMC Report on Economic Projections

Many central banks produce periodic, often quarterly, inflation reports. They do this both to focus public-expectations formation on stated long-run objectives and to discipline pre-meeting preparations and post-meeting communications of the participants.<sup>55</sup>

As they describe how current and prospective policy supports the central bank's mandate, these reports have both a backward- and a forward-looking function. Retrospectively, they provide an evaluation of how policymakers have performed. This includes a discussion of the evolution of economic and financial conditions, and possibly some explanation of views on important unobservable variables like the long-run equilibrium real interest rate and unemployment rate ( $r^*$  and  $U^*$ ), as well as a description of the level and growth rate of potential output. The summary and explanation of recent outcomes

54. Should complaints arise that minutes are a formal accounting and must follow the exact chronology of a meeting itself, we would simply relabel these as "meeting summaries."

55. The Bank of England's *Inflation Report* (<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/inflation-report/inflation-reports>) remains the classic example.

in these reports allow legislators, financial-market participants, and the public at large to hold independent central bankers accountable for their actions.

Prospectively, the reports provide projections of key policy objectives along with a discussion of principal drivers, uncertainties, and risks. In addition, they identify and explain important divergences of views. This enhances transparency, thus shedding light on the policy reaction function and focusing the public debate on what policymakers believe to be the salient features in the outlook.

By creating accountability and transparency, inflation reports also have a powerful influence on internal committee dynamics. The obligation to publish both an *expected value* and a *range* for projections of the state of the economy and policy (something like figure 4) has a number of positive effects. It establishes staff priorities, thus increasing the quality of the background work needed, and focuses internal discussions on the need to reach a consensus.

Ideally, the FOMC would engage in the consensus-building associated with the production of a comprehensive forward-looking economic and policy report in the same manner that the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee does prior to publication of their *Inflation Report*. However, governance challenges make consensus formation difficult. As a result, we view many of our recommendations as practical, second-best alternatives.

Indeed, if meeting-by-meeting consensus is beyond reach, it is nevertheless critical that Federal Reserve policymakers agree on a mechanism for clearly communicating uncertainty. Changes that feature existing material more prominently can materially improve this dimension of FOMC communications. The static uncertainty measures in the SEP (shown previously in figure 4) are not consensus-based, but do include subjective information on whether they are representative of the current situation. Together, they provide a simple basis for a new *Report on Economic Projections*. Making the evolving scale and sources of uncertainty a focus of the Chairman's post-meeting press conferences and of FOMC members' public remarks would then follow naturally.

To be specific, we suggest highlighting the range of uncertainty around the median projections by publishing material that now appears with the minutes—namely, the table that shows the historical projection error ranges and the fan chart for the policy rate—more prominently and more quickly. The same applies to other figures included with the minutes that show the distribution of FOMC

members' subjective perceptions of the uncertainty and risks in their projections for GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation.<sup>56</sup>

Our preferred approach is to release this material in the form of a *Report on Economic Projections* together with the post-meeting statement instead of waiting three weeks until publication of the minutes. Moreover, rather than feature the table with the median projections, start with a chart like the one we reproduce above (figure 4). In addition, the FOMC could include a brief qualitative description of the current state of the economy, of the sources of uncertainty and risk, and of divergences in views. The result would become a natural focus of public discussion by FOMC participants between meetings.

Importantly, such a report needs to be neither long nor complex. The visual summary of the Bank of England's quarterly *Inflation Report*—the May 2019 version has 729 words, four charts, and a Flesch-Kincaid grade-level readability score of 7.7—could serve as a model.<sup>57</sup> In appendix 3, we present a sample *Report on Economic Projections* based on the March 2019 meeting minutes and SEP. This very simple version has fewer than 730 words, with a modest Flesch-Kincaid grade-level score of 9.7.<sup>58</sup>

In a world where policymakers are rightly not committed to a specific interest-rate path, the FOMC can and should exploit existing tools to improve communications regarding the uncertainty of the future policy path. In March 2019, for example, the Committee revealed there is only an even chance the policy rate will be between 1.0 and 4.2 percent by the end of 2021. That range probably far exceeds what most observers believe about FOMC policy uncertainty.

Highlighting the inevitable uncertainty by publishing the fan charts and the historical forecast error table together with the initial SEP, and then presenting these at the Chair's press conference, would help shift the public discussion. Rather than responding with false precision to questions about the median path of policy rates, a focus on the uncertainty associated with the outlook would help to align the Chair's public comments with the risks that the FOMC perceives.

The same goes for the public comments by FOMC participants. If, in addition to the Chair, the Governors and Reserve Bank Presidents

56. For example, in the March 2019 minutes, participants' uncertainty about GDP growth has a positive skew, while the risks were skewed to the downside.

57. Find the May 2019 example at <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/inflation-report/2019/may-2019/visual-summary>.

58. These metrics exclude the report's data appendix.

were to focus their communications on explaining the sources of uncertainty, this would help counter any excessive public attention to the SEP median projections. Moreover, should one or more members explicitly dissent from the Committee's decision, their comments can bring to light whether these disagreements arise from differing assessments of the current state and likely evolution of economic and financial conditions or from different views about the appropriate policy responses to agreed conditions.

Importantly, a *Report on Economic Projections* that gives prominence to uncertainty also can be helpful at the effective lower bound. What is striking about the SEPs of 2012 is the narrow range of interest-rate projections: these were largely stuck at zero until 2014 or 2015. Such a low-uncertainty SEP reinforced the FOMC's broad commitment to keep rates low for longer. Indeed, as figure 5 reveals, the uncertainty bands around the projected policy rate extended below zero into early 2014.

In closing, we note two other refinements that we believe would improve the usefulness of the SEP. First, and most importantly, asking FOMC participants how they would adjust policy in circumstances that deviate substantially from the current economic outlook would provide additional meaningful information about the Committee's reaction function. Even without introducing the *Report on Economic Projections* that we propose, the Committee could supplement the existing SEP with graphical representations of the distributions of participants' responses to a few key scenarios, including (but not limited to) prominent tail risks.

Second, given the simplicity of the *Report on Economic Projections*, the FOMC could choose to publish it following every meeting, rather than every quarter. The increased frequency of the Chair's press conference may have made this option more desirable, but it remains questionable whether there is sufficient economic news to warrant a Report twice each quarter.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

We began by highlighting the enormous progress that the FOMC has made over the past quarter-century in developing a transparent communications framework that promotes accountability and allows for credible policy commitments. The FOMC already communicates a vast amount of information to a wide range of audiences including the

public, elected officials, and experts. The Committee also recognizes the role of communication as a policy tool of its own.

We applaud the Committee's achievements and view our suggestions as incremental steps.

In line with comments received from two dozen former policymakers, academics, and market practitioners, we look for further improvements in the communications framework based on three guiding objectives: to simplify public statements while conveying any divergence of views, clarify how policy will react to changing conditions, and highlight policy uncertainty and risks.

Our proposals to simplify the post-meeting statement and publish a concise *Report on Economic Projections* are squarely in line with these objectives. The first seeks to broaden access to the Committee's most important written description of its actions, of the rationale for these actions, and of its ongoing concerns. The second aims to focus greater attention on the inevitable uncertainty involved in policymaking, underscore the Committee's commitment to correct any errors quickly and transparently as new information becomes available, and further illuminate the Committee's reaction function. Both link directly to the FOMC's Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy and can serve to coordinate more effectively FOMC participants' public communications.

We believe that implementation of these changes will add further to the effectiveness of FOMC communications in promoting the ultimate objectives of price stability and maximum sustainable employment mandated by the Federal Reserve Act.

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## APPENDIX A

### **The Interview Process**

On January 7, 2019, we sent the following email:

Dear XXX,

As you may know, the Federal Reserve is undertaking a review of its strategies, tools, and communication practices. Included in this is a research conference in early June 2019, available at <https://www.federalreserve.gov/conferences/conference-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-communications-20190605.htm>. Vice Chairman Clarida and his colleagues have invited us to contribute a paper on communication to that conference. To prepare, we would like to interview former officials, academics, and practitioners to get a sense of their views on the issue. Our hope is that you will agree to help.

Would you be willing to answer a few questions either in writing or in a telephone interview?

We have three questions:

1. What do you see as the primary objectives of FOMC communication?
2. How do you think FOMC communication should evolve over the next five to ten years?
3. What do you view as the greatest challenges to effective FOMC communication?

You are welcome to send written responses. Alternatively, should you wish to do this over the phone, we would ask for permission to record and transcribe the interview. Regardless of how you respond to the questions—written, or oral and transcribed—we would attribute any of your responses (in the form of quotes or otherwise) only with your explicit approval.

By way of background, we have interviewed central-bank officials on several past occasions. For example, at the time of the tenth anniversary of the European Monetary Union, we interviewed 17 senior officials for a paper entitled “How Central Bankers See It: The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond,” which is available at <http://people.brandeis.edu/~cecchett/Polpdf/Polp44.pdf>.

It would be most helpful if we could speak with you or obtain your responses by mid-February. Please let us know if you are willing to answer the questions and, if so, whether you prefer to do it in writing or in the course of a 20-minute phone call.

Thank you very much for considering our request.  
 Happy New Year and best regards,  
 Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz

We contacted 35 people. Of these, 10 responded in writing and 14 agreed to oral interviews. The list of those who responded is in the following table.

For the interviews, we began by asking for permission to record the interview. We then reiterated the ground rules for attribution and then asked our questions. In some cases, following the three questions, we asked further clarifying questions.

**Table A1. List of Interview Respondents**  
 (written or oral interview, with date)

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Lewis Alexander (written, Feb/19/2019)	Peter Hooper (written, Feb/26/2019)
Ben Bernanke (written, Jan/15/2019)	Anil Kashyap (written, Jan/7/2019)
Richard Berner (written, Feb/7/2019)	Mervyn A. King (interview, Feb/6/2019)
Seth Carpenter (written, Feb/25/2019)	Dennis Lockhart (interview, Jan/22/2019)
William C. Dudley (interview, Feb/7/2019)	Catherine Mann (interview, Feb/1/2019)
Robert DiClemente (written, Feb/5/2019)	Frederic S. Mishkin (interview, Feb/12/2019)
Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. (interview, Feb/4/2019)	Charles Plosser (interview, Jan/25/2019)
Michael Feroli (interview, Jan/15/2019)	Jeremy C. Stein (written, Jan/12/2019)
Stanley Fischer (interview, Jan/29/2019)	Paul M. W. Tucker (interview, Jan/16/2019)
Peter R. Fisher (interview, Mar/1/2019)	Paul A. Wachtel (interview, Mar/1/2019)
Mark Gertler (interview, Jan/17/2019)	David Wessel (interview, Jan/8/2019)
David Greenlaw (written, Feb/21/2019)	Janet L. Yellen (interview, Feb/11/2019)

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## APPENDIX B

**Simplifying the FOMC Statement**

This appendix contains a comparison of the original and alternative formulation of the post-meeting FOMC statements for December 13, 2017, and March 20, 2019. For the alternative statement, we include headers for the sections that we would not expect to see in an actual release.

**Original FOMC Statement for December 13, 2017**

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in November indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising at a solid rate. Averaging through hurricane-related fluctuations, job gains have been solid, and the unemployment rate declined further. Household spending has been expanding at a moderate rate, and growth in business fixed investment has picked up in recent quarters. On a 12-month basis, both overall inflation and inflation for items other than food and energy have declined this year and are running below 2 percent. Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. Hurricane-related disruptions and rebuilding have affected economic activity, employment, and inflation in recent months but have not materially altered the outlook for the national economy. Consequently, the Committee continues to expect that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace and labor market conditions will remain strong. Inflation on a 12-month basis is expected to remain somewhat below 2 percent in the near term but to stabilize around the Committee's 2-percent objective over the medium term. Near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced, but the Committee is monitoring inflation developments closely.

In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal-funds rate to 1–1/4 to 1–1/2 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting strong labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2-percent inflation.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal-funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2-percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant gradual increases in the federal-funds rate; the federal-funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal-funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Jerome H. Powell; and Randal K. Quarles. Voting against the action were Charles L. Evans and Neel Kashkari, who preferred at this meeting to maintain the existing target range for the federal-funds rate.

### **Alternative FOMC Statement for December 13, 2017**

#### **Actions:**

To foster maximum employment and price stability, we agreed to raise the target range for the federal-funds rate to  $1\frac{1}{4}$  to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  percent from the current range of 1 to  $1\frac{1}{4}$  percent.

We will continue to shrink our balance sheet, letting it fall by \$10 billion this month, and then by \$20 billion per month starting in January 2018.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Jerome H. Powell; and Randal K. Quarles. Voting against the action were Charles L. Evans and Neel Kashkari, who preferred at this meeting to maintain the existing target range for the federal-funds rate.

#### **Rationale for action and divergence of views:**

Most of us believe that gains in consumer and business spending, aided by supportive financial conditions and an improving global economy, are keeping growth at a pace above trend. Some of us also expect that labor market pressures will show through to inflation over the next few years.

Two of us disagree with the interest-rate decision, noting that inflation remains clearly below 2 percent and preferring to wait until inflation moves closer to our long-term goal or expected inflation rises.

**Uncertainties and risks to the outlook:**

The uncertainty of our projections for future growth, unemployment, and inflation has not changed over the past few months and remains similar to the average over the past 20 years.

While we see the near-term risks to the outlook as roughly balanced, changes in conditions could lead to faster or slower changes in policy. On the upside, fiscal stimulus or easy financial-market conditions could raise inflation above our goal and push growth further above its trend. On the downside, there is the chance that actual or expected inflation will fail to move up to our 2-percent goal.

Turning to the balance sheet, several of us note the importance of monitoring the impact of a fall in the size of our securities holdings on long-term interest rates and economic performance.

**Original FOMC Statement from March 20, 2019:**

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in January indicates that the labor market remains strong but that growth of economic activity has slowed from its solid rate in the fourth quarter. Payroll employment was little changed in February, but job gains have been solid, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Recent indicators point to slower growth of household spending and business fixed investment in the first quarter. On a 12-month basis, overall inflation has declined, largely as a result of lower energy prices; inflation for items other than food and energy remains near 2 percent. On balance, market-based measures of inflation compensation have remained low in recent months, and survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal-funds rate at 2–1/4 to 2–1/2 percent. The Committee continues to view sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee’s symmetric 2-percent objective as the most likely outcomes. In light of global economic and financial developments and muted inflation pressures, the Committee will be patient as it determines what future adjustments to the target

range for the federal-funds rate may be appropriate to support these outcomes.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal-funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2-percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Jerome H. Powell, Chairman; John C. Williams, Vice Chairman; Michelle W. Bowman; Lael Brainard; James Bullard; Richard H. Clarida; Charles L. Evans; Esther L. George; Randal K. Quarles; and Eric S. Rosengren.

### **Alternative FOMC Statement for March 20, 2019:**

#### **Actions:**

To foster maximum employment and price stability, we agreed to maintain the target range for the federal-funds rate at 2¼ to 2½ percent.

From May to the end of September 2019, we will slow and then cease the decline in our holdings of Treasury securities.

Voting for the FOMC action were: Jerome H. Powell, Chairman; John C. Williams, Vice Chairman; Michelle W. Bowman; Lael Brainard; James Bullard; Richard H. Clarida; Charles L. Evans; Esther L. George; Randal K. Quarles; and Eric S. Rosengren.

#### **Rationale for action and divergence of views:**

We foresee sustained real growth, a strong labor market, and inflation near our 2-percent long-run goal as the most likely outcomes over coming years.

As for the balance sheet, setting a date for ending the runoff of securities holdings reduces uncertainty and fits with our decision to continue setting policy in a regime of ample reserves.

There were no major disagreements.

#### **Uncertainties and risks to the outlook:**

The uncertainty of our projections for growth, unemployment, and inflation is similar to the norm over the past 20 years.

A number of risks could influence the path of interest rates. On the downside, these include softness in spending, a sharp decline in fiscal stimulus, the uncertainty from ongoing trade talks, Brexit, a further slowdown in Europe and China, and a failure of inflation to rise to

the 2-percent target. On the upside, risks include a sharp rebound in consumer and business sentiment, a pickup in the trend rate of growth, and an increase in wage pressures. A few of us are concerned that financial stability risks could rise if policy interest rates remain low for longer.

Turning to the balance sheet, shrinkage beyond that planned has costs and benefits. On the one hand, reduced securities holdings might lead to greater interest-rate movements. On the other hand, by reducing reserves in the banking system, it could help us learn about banks' demand for reserves. Overall, the scope for further declines in the size of the balance sheet after September 2019 may be limited.

## APPENDIX C

**A Concise Report on Economic Projections**

We construct a concise *Report on Economic Projections* from information in the minutes and the SEP associated with the March 19–20 FOMC meeting and released on April 20, 2019.<sup>59</sup> In the data appendix, we include the matrix of projections from March 19–20, 2013<sup>60</sup> as representative of what we recommend the FOMC publish immediately following each quarterly SEP meeting. We note that, when combined with the matrix published in the prior quarter, this information allows anyone who so wishes to reproduce all the charts in the complete SEP that accompanies the minutes.

**Report on Economic Projections, March 2019**

Consistent with our Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee’s symmetric 2-percent objective are the most likely outcomes over the next few years. While there is considerable uncertainty, most of us, the FOMC participants, project that for 2019, 2020, and 2021, inflation will remain near target, growth will slow to a rate near 2 percent, the unemployment rate will remain slightly below 4 percent, and the policy rate is likely to remain steady.

*Inflation near target*

Largely reflecting earlier declines in crude oil prices, inflation has been softer than expected. Most of us view this as temporary, expecting inflation to rise to the Committee’s longer-run objective of 2 percent over the next few years. At the same time, many noted that inflation has not risen much in spite of faster wage gains and the impact of higher tariffs. This suggests to some of us that long-term inflation expectations could be below 2 percent.

Over the next few years, most of us project inflation to remain steady near the long-run objective of 2 percent. We judge that the uncertainty of projections is roughly in line with historical levels, with an even


59. See <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>

60. See <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20130320SEPcompilation.pdf>


chance that prices will rise at a rate between 1.2 and 2.8 percent rate by 2021. Rising wages and tariff increases pose some upside risk, but past low inflation also could lower inflation expectations, so several participants see the risks tilted to the downside.

**Figure C1. Projections for Inflation**

*Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors*



*FOMC participants' assessments of uncertainty and risks around their economic projections*



Source: <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>

*Growth slowing*

The U.S. expansion is likely to continue, but at a slower pace than in late 2018, as growth slows abroad and the impact of 2018 tax cuts and increases in public spending wanes. In 2019 and 2020, growth will likely be closer to 2 percent, down from just over 3 percent in 2018. Even so, a strong labor market, rising incomes, and better financial conditions should sustain household spending.

Past levels of uncertainty imply that the chance of growth between 0 and 4 percent over the next two to three years is about 70 percent, but some of us view growth uncertainty as higher than in the past. A few of us see the risks as tilted to the downside, noting softness in housing, uncertainty regarding trade talks and Brexit, and the possibility of a greater slowdown in Europe and China. Estimates of growth in the longer run remain between 1.7 and 2.2 percent.

*Unemployment rate stable*

Labor markets remain strong, with solid job gains, a further increase in people returning to work, low layoffs, a near-record number of job openings, and reports of firms offering better pay and benefits to attract workers. Most of our projections show the unemployment rate barely rising over coming years, often remaining below the bottom of the range of projections for the longer run (from 4.0 percent to 4.6 percent). At the same time, some noted that the mix of low and steady inflation and rising employment points to further slack in the labor market.

Past norms imply an error range going from 2.2 to 5.6 percent for the projected unemployment rate in 2021. However, some of us are more uncertain about labor market projections than usual. Nevertheless, we generally see the risks around the unemployment outlook as roughly balanced.

*Policy rates steady*


This year, a majority expects that the outlook and risks to the outlook will warrant leaving the policy rate unchanged. Some think that a continuation of above-trend growth could favor a modest policy-rate hike, while others note that new data and risks could shift their views of the policy-rate target in either direction. Over the next few years, many of us foresee the policy rate rising only slightly.

While the range of forecasts for the path of the policy rate widens after this year, the median projection barely changes, edging up to 2.6 percent at the end of 2021 from the current range of 2¼ to 2½ percent.


Uncertainty around interest-rate forecasts is very large compared to this small increase in the central forecast: based on past norms, there is only a 70-percent chance that the end-2021 target interest rate will be between 0.1 and 5.1 percent.

**Figure C2. Projections for GDP Growth**

*Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors*




*FOMC participants' assessments of uncertainty and risks around their economic projections*




Source: <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>

**Figure C3. Projections for Unemployment**

*Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors*




*FOMC participants' assessments of uncertainty and risks around their economic projections*



Source: <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>

**Figure C4. Projections for the Federal-funds Rate**

*Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors*



Source: <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>

**Data Appendix**

The following tables and figures provide more detail about the economic and policy projections of FOMC participants. Table C1 reports the median, central tendency, and range for the March 2019 and December 2018 projections of real growth, unemployment, inflation, and the federal-funds rate for the years 2019, 2020, and 2021, as well as for the longer run. Figure C5 plots the individual projections for the federal-funds rate. Table C2 reports the error ranges (based on past norms) that are used to compute the shaded areas in figures C1 to C4. Table C3 is the matrix of projections that links them by FOMC participant.

**Table C1. Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, under their Individual Assessments of Projected Appropriate Monetary Policy, March 2019**

<i>Percent</i>		<i>Central Tendency<sup>2</sup></i>										<i>Range<sup>3</sup></i>		
<i>Variable</i>		<i>Median<sup>1</sup></i>									<i>Longer run</i>			
		2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	Longer run
Change in real GDP		2.1	1.9	1.8	1.9-2.2	1.8-2.0	1.7-2.0	1.8-2.0	1.6-2.4	1.7-2.2	1.5-2.2	1.7-2.2	1.7-2.2	1.7-2.2
December projection		2.3	2.0	1.8	2.3-2.5	1.8-2.0	1.5-2.0	1.8-2.0	2.0-2.7	1.5-2.2	1.4-2.1	1.7-2.2	1.7-2.2	1.7-2.2
Unemployment rate		3.7	3.8	3.9	3.6-3.8	3.6-3.9	3.7-4.1	4.1-4.5	3.5-4.0	3.4-4.1	3.4-4.2	4.0-4.6	4.0-4.6	4.0-4.6
December projection		3.5	3.6	3.8	3.5-3.7	3.5-3.8	3.6-3.9	4.2-4.5	3.4-4.0	3.4-4.3	3.4-4.2	4.0-4.6	4.0-4.6	4.0-4.6
PCE inflation		1.8	2.0	2.0	1.8-1.9	2.0-2.1	2.0-2.1	2.0	1.6-2.1	1.9-2.2	2.0-2.2	2.0	2.0	2.0
December projection		1.9	2.1	2.1	1.8-2.1	2.0-2.1	2.0-2.1	2.0	1.8-2.2	2.0-2.2	2.0-2.3	2.0	2.0	2.0
Core PCE inflation <sup>4</sup>		2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9-2.0	2.0-2.1	2.0-2.1	2.0-2.1	1.8-2.2	1.8-2.2	1.9-2.2	2.0-2.2	2.0-2.2	2.0-2.2
December projection		2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0-2.1	2.0-2.1	2.0-2.1	2.0-2.1	1.9-2.2	2.0-2.2	2.0-2.3	2.0-2.2	2.0-2.2	2.0-2.2
Memo: Projected appropriate policy path														
Federal funds rate		2.4	2.6	2.6	2.4-2.6	2.4-2.9	2.4-2.9	2.5-3.0	2.4-2.9	2.4-3.4	2.4-3.6	2.5-3.5	2.5-3.5	2.5-3.5
December projection		2.9	3.1	3.1	2.6-3.1	2.9-3.4	2.6-3.1	2.5-3.0	2.4-3.1	2.4-3.6	2.4-3.6	2.5-3.5	2.5-3.5	2.5-3.5

Source: <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>

Note: Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and projections for both measures of inflation are percent changes from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in, respectively, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and the price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections for the unemployment rate are for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indicated. Each participant's projections are based on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections represent each participant's assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. The projections for the federal funds rate are the value of the midpoint of the projected appropriate target range for the federal funds rate or the projected appropriate target level for the federal funds rate at the end of the specified calendar year or over the longer run. The December projections were made in conjunction with the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on December 18-19, 2018. One participant did not submit longer-run projections for the change in real GDP, the unemployment rate, or the federal funds rate in conjunction with the December 18-19, 2018, meeting, and one participant did not submit such projections in conjunction with the March 19-20, 2019, meeting.


1. For each period, the median is the middle projection when the projections are arranged from lowest to highest. When the number of projections is even, the median is the average of the two middle projections.

2. The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.

3. The range for a variable in a given year includes all participants' projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year.

4. Longer-run projections for core PCE inflation are not collected.

**Figure C5. FOMC Participants’ Assessments of Appropriate Monetary Policy: Midpoint of Target Range or Target Level for the Federal-funds Rate (end of period), March 20, 2019**



Source: <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>

**Table C2. Average Historical Projection Error Ranges (in percentage points)**

<i>Variable</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>
Change in real GDP <sup>1</sup>	±1.4	±1.9	±1.9
Unemployment rate <sup>1</sup>	±0.5	±1.3	±1.7
Total consumer prices <sup>2</sup>	±0.9	±1.0	±1.1
Short-term interest rates <sup>3</sup>	±0.9	±2.0	±2.5

Source: <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190320ep.htm>

NOTE: Error ranges shown are measured as plus or minus the root mean squared error of projections for 1999 through 2018 that were released in the spring by various private and government forecasters. As described in the box “Forecast Uncertainty,” under certain assumptions, there is about a 70 percent probability that actual outcomes for real GDP, unemployment, consumer prices, and the federal funds rate will be in ranges implied by the average size of projection errors made in the past. For more information, see David Reifschneider and Peter Tulip (2017), “Gauging the Uncertainty of the Economic Outlook Using Historical Forecasting Errors: The Federal Reserve’s Approach,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-020 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February), <https://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2017.020>.

1. Definitions of variables are in the general note to table 1.
2. Measure is the overall consumer price index, the price measure that has been most widely used in government and private economic forecasts. Projections are percent changes on a fourth quarter to fourth quarter basis.
3. For Federal Reserve staff forecasts, measure is the federal funds rate. For other forecasts, measure is the rate on 3-month Treasury bills. Projection errors are calculated using average levels, in percent, in the fourth quarter.

**Table C3. Economic Projections, 2013–2015 and over the Longer Run** (in percent)

<i>Projection</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Change in real GDP</i>	<i>Unemployment rate</i>	<i>PCE inflation</i>	<i>Core PCE inflation</i>	<i>Federal funds rate</i>
1	2013	2.6	7.4	1.3	1.5	0.13
2	2013	2.4	7.6	1.4	1.5	0.13
3	2013	2.8	7.3	1.3	1.6	0.13
4	2013	2.7	7.5	1.4	1.6	0.13
5	2013	2.8	7.3	1.3	1.6	0.13
6	2013	2.6	7.5	1.4	1.7	0.13
7	2013	2.3	7.5	1.7	1.6	0.13
8	2013	2.3	7.4	1.7	1.7	0.13
9	2013	2.6	7.5	1.3	1.6	0.13
10	2013	2.5	7.4	1.4	1.6	0.13
11	2013	2.3	7.5	1.5	1.5	0.13
12	2013	2.0	7.6	1.6	1.6	0.13
13	2013	2.4	7.5	1.3	1.6	0.13
14	2013	2.3	7.5	1.8	1.5	0.13
15	2013	2.6	7.4	1.8	1.6	0.13
16	2013	2.9	7.2	1.7	1.6	0.13
17	2013	3.0	6.9	2.0	2.0	1.00
18	2013	3.0	7.0	1.6	1.6	0.13
19	2013	2.5	7.3	1.5	1.6	0.13
1	2014	3.4	6.8	1.7	1.8	0.13
2	2014	3.2	7.0	1.6	1.7	0.13
3	2014	3.4	6.8	1.6	1.7	0.13
4	2014	3.8	7.1	1.4	1.7	0.13
5	2014	3.5	6.7	1.8	1.9	0.13
6	2014	3.4	6.9	1.6	1.8	0.13
7	2014	2.6	6.8	1.9	1.8	1.00
8	2014	2.9	6.9	2.0	2.0	0.13
9	2014	3.2	7.0	1.5	1.7	0.13
10	2014	3.3	6.9	1.7	1.8	0.13
11	2014	3.3	7.0	1.5	1.5	0.13
12	2014	2.6	7.0	1.9	1.9	1.00
13	2014	3.2	7.0	1.5	1.7	0.13
14	2014	3.5	6.4	2.0	1.9	0.13
15	2014	2.9	7.0	1.8	1.7	0.13
16	2014	3.0	6.9	2.0	2.0	0.50
17	2014	3.0	6.2	2.0	2.0	2.75
18	2014	3.2	6.1	2.1	2.1	1.75
19	2014	3.2	6.7	2.0	2.0	0.13

**Table C3. Economic Projections, 2013–2015 and over the Longer Run (continued) (in percent)**

<i>Projection</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Change in real GDP</i>	<i>Unemployment rate</i>	<i>PCE inflation</i>	<i>Core PCE inflation</i>	<i>Federal funds rate</i>
1	2015	3.8	6.1	2.1	2.1	0.50
2	2015	3.5	6.3	1.7	1.8	1.00
3	2015	3.7	6.2	1.9	1.8	0.75
4	2015	3.7	6.0	1.6	1.9	1.25
5	2015	3.5	6.0	2.0	2.1	1.25
6	2015	3.7	6.1	1.7	1.9	0.50
7	2015	2.9	6.2	2.0	2.0	3.00
8	2015	3.0	6.3	2.0	2.0	1.25
9	2015	3.5	6.3	1.6	1.7	0.50
10	2015	3.4	6.4	1.9	1.9	0.50
11	2015	3.5	6.5	2.0	1.8	0.50
12	2015	2.9	6.5	2.0	2.0	2.00
13	2015	3.6	6.3	2.0	2.0	0.50
14	2015	3.5	5.7	2.0	2.0	1.00
15	2015	3.2	6.5	1.9	1.8	0.50
16	2015	3.2	6.5	2.0	2.0	1.25
17	2015	2.5	6.0	2.0	2.0	4.50
18	2015	2.8	6.0	2.6	2.6	3.75
19	2015	3.4	6.0	2.1	2.1	0.13
1	LR	2.5	5.2	2.0		4.00
2	LR	2.0	5.4	2.0		4.00
3	LR	2.3	5.3	2.0		3.80
4	LR	2.3	6.0	2.0		4.50
5	LR	2.3	5.5	2.0		4.00
6	LR	2.3	5.2	2.0		3.25
7	LR	2.1	6.0	2.0		4.00
8	LR	2.5	5.2	2.0		4.50
9	LR	3.0	5.4	2.0		4.00
10	LR	2.3	5.5	2.0		4.30
11	LR	2.2	5.4	2.0		4.00
12	LR	2.3	5.5	2.0		4.30
13	LR	2.5	5.2	2.0		4.00
14	LR	2.3	5.0	2.0		3.50
15	LR	2.5	6.0	2.0		4.00
16	LR	2.5	5.5	2.0		4.00
17	LR	2.5	6.0	2.0		4.50
18	LR	2.3	6.0	2.0		4.25
19	LR	2.3	6.0	2.0		3.50

Note: This version reproduces the material released with the transcripts of the March 19–20, 2013 meeting. It is indicative of the matrix that we propose to be released with the *Report on Economic Projections*. Ideally, the Report would substitute the names of the participants for the numbers in column 1.

## APPENDIX D

**A Brief History of FOMC Communications**

Over the past three decades, Federal Reserve communication has evolved dramatically in an effort to improve accountability and make policy more effective.

Prior to 1993, there were no statements following FOMC meetings, no published minutes, no timely release of any FOMC materials, and certainly no press conferences. In other words, the FOMC never disclosed changes in policy. A cottage industry of private-sector experts worked to figure things out by taking actions like dissecting daily open-market operations. The lack of transparency made the “policy-discovery” process costly and inefficient.


Opacity did not mean that the Fed kept policy stable. In fact, as of the late 1980s, there were interest-rate targets of a sort, and these changed frequently.<sup>61</sup> Figure D1 displays a simple count of the number of federal-funds-rate target changes from 1987 onward. In 1988, Chairman Greenspan’s first full year in office, the target changed 13 times. Of these, however, only three changes occurred at or around the time of one of the eight scheduled FOMC meetings (black bars); four were announced to the FOMC, but not to the public, on impromptu conference calls (gray bars); and the remaining six were not associated with any documented FOMC communication (dashed-pattern bars). Put differently, it is not even clear when and how the FOMC members other than the Chairman learned of nearly half of the changes.

Since 14 of the 22 changes between August 1987 and May 1989 were smaller than 25 basis points, we suspect some of these were technical adjustments designed to keep reserve markets at the desired equilibrium level. Regardless, from today’s perspective, three things stand out: changes occurred frequently; the bulk of the decisions to make the changes did not occur at a formal FOMC meeting; and, on many occasions, the Chairman did not appear to consult FOMC members prior to the policy implementation. Put differently, the FOMC Chairman really did control monetary policy.<sup>62</sup>

61. Based on an analysis of meeting transcripts, Thornton (2006) concludes that the “FOMC effectively switched to a funds rate targeting procedure in 1982.”

62. For the comprehensive official history of FOMC communication in the last quarter of the 20th century, see Lindsey (2003).

**Figure D1. Number of Changes in the Federal-funds-rate Target, 1986–2018**



Source: Table 1 in Thornton (2006) and Federal Open Market Committee.

Table D1 reports notable developments in Federal Reserve communication policy. Two events in the early 1990s are notable. First, in 1993, the FOMC began publishing minutes of its meetings. (Initially released three days after the following meeting, the current practice of issuing minutes three weeks following a meeting began in 2004). Second, on February 4, 1994, the FOMC released the first immediate post-meeting announcement of a policy change.<sup>63</sup>

“Chairman Alan Greenspan announced today that the Federal Open Market Committee decided to increase slightly the degree of pressure on reserve positions. The action is expected to be associated with a small increase in short-term money-market interest rates.

The decision was taken to move toward a less accommodative stance in monetary policy in order to sustain and enhance the economic expansion.

Chairman Greenspan decided to announce this action immediately so as to avoid any misunderstanding of the Committee’s purposes, given the fact that this is the first firming of reserve market conditions by the Committee since early 1989.”

For the next few years, the FOMC only released statements to announce policy shifts. These were equally succinct, albeit including

63. See <https://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/19940204default.htm>.

announcements of discount rate changes. Starting in July 1995, statements explicitly mentioned a numerical target for the federal-funds rate; by 1996, they no longer referred to Chairman Greenspan; and in 1997, the statements began to include more than a one-sentence justification for the action. The current practice of issuing a statement following every meeting—regardless of whether the interest-rate target was changed—began in May 1999. Only in March 2002 did these statements reveal members' votes. In other words, the statements we have come to expect are a relatively recent innovation.

This move to public announcements marks a clear shift in the FOMC's balance of power. While the Chairman retains substantial influence over the direction of policy—controlling information and the tone of discussions to deliver a consensus for their desired outcome—the Chair's discretionary authority to change the interest-rate target between meetings effectively disappeared.

The publication of the statements also represents an unprecedented increase in policy transparency. As we indicated earlier, prior to 1994, market participants would look for hints of policy changes in signals they scraped together from open market operations (OMOs), reserve data, and weekly statistics on the size of the money stock—a process that required substantial technical expertise and the passage of time to observe various data. Once these announcements started, there was no turning back. Since 1994, observers no longer need to ask whether policy has changed, but whether it will change. The discussion is now completely forward-looking.

Returning to the timeline, November 2007 marks the publication of the first Survey of Economic Projections (SEP). Over the course of the next few years, the FOMC supplemented this initial version by adding projections for the longer run, histograms showing the subjective balance of risks and level of uncertainty, and then the projection of the federal-funds rate (the dot plot).

Finally, we note the FOMC Chair's press conference. Initiated in April 2011 as a complement to the publication of an enhanced SEP, it now follows every regularly scheduled meeting.

**Table D1. Communications Timeline: Notable Developments, 1993–2019**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Action</i>
Mar 1993	FOMC begins publishing minutes following the subsequent meeting
Nov 1993	FOMC votes to issue lightly-edited transcripts after a five-year lag
Feb 1994	FOMC begins issuing statements when policy changes
Aug 1997	FOMC communicates directive to FRBNY Markets Desk in terms of a federal-funds-rate target
May 1999	FOMC begins issuing statement following every meeting
Mar 2002	FOMC begins publishing individual votes in each statement
Aug 2003	FOMC includes time-dependent forward guidance in post-meeting statement
Dec 2004	FOMC shortens lag in publishing minutes to three weeks
Nov 2007	FOMC releases first quarterly Summary of Economic Projections as addendum to minutes, showing ranges and central tendencies of participants' growth, inflation, unemployment for up to three years
Nov 2008	Federal Reserve announces first large-scale asset purchase (LSAP)
Feb 2009	FOMC adds "longer-run" projections to SEP for growth, inflation, and unemployment
Apr 2011	Quarterly press conferences begin; FOMC releases SEP summary statistics at press conference
Nov 2011	Histograms in SEP show assessments of balance of risks and of level of uncertainty compared to past 20 years
Jan 2012	FOMC publishes first "Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy" specifying quantitative target for PCE inflation of 2%
Jan 2012	FOMC participants' projections for federal-funds rate added to SEP; "Dot plot" included in post-meeting summary

**Table D1. Communications Timeline: Notable Developments, 1993–2019 (continued)**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Action</i>
Dec 2013	Federal Reserve announces that it will start to taper LSAPs
Sep 2014	FOMC issues post-meeting statement regarding balance-sheet normalization
Sep 2015	Medians added to SEP summary and to the SEP addendum to the minutes
Jan 2016	FOMC specifies inflation goal as “symmetric”
Jan 2017	FOMC releases “matrix” version of 2012 SEP with transcripts (five-year lag)
Apr 2017	Fan charts added showing forecast errors around median SEP projections
Jun 2017	FOMC releases “Addendum” specifying balance-sheet normalization plans
Jan 2018	Release of Participant Key for first SEP (Oct 2007; 10-year lag)
Jan 2019	Press conferences after every meeting (rather than quarterly)
Jan 2019	FOMC releases statement regarding monetary policy implementation with abundant reserves
Mar 2019	FOMC detail balance-sheet normalization consistent with abundant-reserves policy management

Quotation marks denote key developments.

Source: Based significantly on Federal Reserve’s Transparency Steps,<sup>64</sup> Reuters, January 25, 2012, and on Timelines of Policy Actions and Communications: Summary of Economic Projections,<sup>65</sup> Federal Reserve Board. For communications since 2008 regarding forward guidance and balance-sheet policies, see Timelines of Policy Actions and Communications,<sup>66</sup> Federal Reserve Board.

Throughout this roughly 25-year period, the complexity and length of the FOMC statement have waxed and waned, but there appears to be no long-run trend. Following Davis and Wynne (2016), we use the Flesch-Kincaid grade-level formula, which converts a metric of


64. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-communications-idUSTRE80O2QQ20120125>

65. <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/timeline-summary-of-economic-projections.htm>

66. <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-fed-listens-timelines.htm>


complexity into a U.S. grade-level-reading equivalent. Figure D2 plots the results of this simple exercise, with the grade level on the vertical axis and the number of words in the statement reflected in the size of each bubble. We also distinguish the statements under each Fed chair—Greenspan, Bernanke, Yellen, and Powell.

**Figure D2. Complexity of the FOMC Statement, 1994-May 2019**



Source: Davis and Wynne (2016) and authors' calculations using the readability calculator at <http://www.readabilityformulas.com/free-readability-formula-tests.php>. Note: Each bubble represents a post-meeting statement, with the size indicating the number of words (see the internal legend). The dashed horizontal line represents the average Flesch-Kincaid grade level of 16.6.

**Figure D3. Dissents by FOMC voting members as a share of total votes (percent), 1957–2019**



Source: Fraction of recorded dissents in votes from January 1957 to May 2019. Based on data in figure 2 from Thornton and Wheelock (2014); updates since 2013 by the authors.

Policymakers and monetary economists alike believe in the value of transparency. They see it as a way to ensure accountability, create credibility, and improve the effectiveness of monetary policy. But the release of information does have limits for at least two reasons. First, laying decision-making open for all to see can damage the deliberative process, making it more formal and less open to controversial options. Second, increased communication runs the risk of sending confusing signals. As Lewis Alexander said, *“For statements of policy intentions to be useful, they must be credible. Not doing what you said you were going to do undermines that credibility. This is a reason not to say too much.”*

Has the extraordinary increase in FOMC transparency since 1993 muted the aggressiveness and weakened the quality of internal committee debate? As *prima facie* evidence for this proposition, one could note the virtual elimination of open dissents by Governors since 1993 (figure A.4.3). Meade and Stasavage (2008) find evidence that the publication of meeting transcripts, approved by the FOMC in October 1993, diminished subsequent incentives to dissent. However, there has been little change in the frequency of dissent by regional bank presidents. Similarly, while confirming a “negative conformity effect” following the release of transcripts, Hansen and others (2018) conclude that the “discipline effect”—the increased incentive to prepare for and to influence the deliberations—dominated. Likewise, Woolley and Gardner (2017) find no impact from the publication of transcripts on the use of reasoned arguments in the internal deliberations, even as voting patterns shifted.

In closing, table A4.2 identifies, as of May 2019, the FOMC’s eight primary communications tools, including information on the frequency and timing of their publication.

**Table D2. Summary of Primary FOMC Communications Tools, May 2019**

<i>Type</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Release Timing</i>
Policy statement	8 times per year	After each meeting
Minutes	8 times per year	3 weeks after each meeting
Press conference	8 times per year	After each meeting
Summary of Economic Projections	4 times per year	After designated meeting
Monetary Policy Report to Congress	2 times per year	February and July
Speeches and other public remarks	Continuous	NA
Statement on Longer-Run Goals & Policy Strategy	1 time per year	January
Policy Normalization Principles and Plans	Updated periodically	After meeting

Source: Table 1 in Kliesen and others (2019).

